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ABSTRACT
Although climate change is expected to have a major effect on the
global environment in its broadest sense, one of its earliest and most
direct impacts will be on Earth's fresh water systems. While some
regions will experience increased precipitation, others will suffer serious
water scarcity. And some will endure both as climatic variability
impacts regional weather patterns resulting in erratic or abnormal rain
and drought events.
This, in turn, will affect human migration patterns, population
growths, agricultural activities, economic development, river flows and
geographies, and the global environment. This article explores the
impact that climate change will have on regional and global fresh water
resources and the resulting legal and policy implications that will
challenge all nations. In particular, it assesses the ability of international
water law to respond to climate change consequences and offers
recommendations that could help nations and the international
community to meet the challenges posed by this global phenomenon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Of the various consequences anticipated from global climate
change, the earliest and most direct will affect Earth's fresh water
systems. These impacts, however, will not be uniform. While scientists
expect an overall warmer climate globally, climate change will actually
result in great variability in global weather patterns such that some
regions will become substantially wetter while others significantly dryer.
As noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the
tropics and higher latitudes regions, such as northern Europe and
northern North America, are expected to experience an increase in
precipitation.' In contrast, the IPCC projects drying in the sub-tropics
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Technical Paper on Climate Change and
Water, at 32, Doe. IPCC-XXVIII/Doc.13 (8.IV.2008) (Apr. 10, 2008) [hereinafter IPCC
Technical Paper].
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and mid-latitude areas, such as Central America, southern Europe,
northern and southern Africa, and Australia.2
More ominous are scientists' projections related to the
magnitude, frequency, and intensity of the changes in precipitation
levels.' Many of the regions likely to dry out-including the
Mediterranean region and the subtropical western coasts of each
continent-will suffer a reduction in precipitation of up to 20% with
longer bouts of dry spells between rain events.' Moreover, they are
likely to experience more intense, more frequent and longer-lasting heat
waves.' The result will be protracted droughts in many of the world's
most populated areas affecting agricultural production, economic
development, the environment, human health, population growth, and
power generation.
In contrast, many of the regions expecting an upsurge in
precipitation-such as the monsoon region of southern Asia, eastern
Africa and the equatorial Pacific Ocean-will experience an annual
increase of more than 20% over current rainfall levels.6 This increase
will manifest in more volatile and intense precipitation events over
shorter periods of time that likewise could have serious consequences for
agricultural production, economic development, the environment, human
health, population growth, and power generation.7 Still other parts of the
world will undergo climatic and environmental alterations as a result of
changes in the timing of precipitation events. For example, premature
spring melts and early or delayed monsoon seasons will have tremendous
consequences for ecosystems and local climates and, as a result, on
2 Id.
3 See Bernhard Lehner et al., Estimating The Impact of Global Change on Flood and Drought
Risks in Europe: A Continental, Integrated Analysis, 75 CLIMATIC CHANGE 273, 274 (2006)
(asserting that "changes in the frequencies of extreme events, such as floods and droughts, may
be of the most significant consequences of climate change... Moreover, during extreme low and
high-flow events the threats to human societies and the environment are likely to be most critical,
and the conflicts between competing requirements to be most intense."); see also Gerald A.
Meehl et al., Global Climate Projections, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS 747, 768 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (noting that the collective of climate change
models evidence indicate considerable variation in the magnitude of change).
4 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 33; Meehl, supra note 3, at 768, 782.
Meehl, supra note 3, at 783. The heat wave that gripped Europe in 2003, resulting in the deaths
of at least 20,000, is the type of extreme heat event expected to become more common as
average global climatic temperatures increase. When Warming Affects Health, in GLOBAL
WARMING 46 (Kelly Knauer, ed., 2007).
6 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 33.
Meehl, supra note 3, at 768, 783.
Vol. 27, No. 3
Wisconsin International Law Journal
species and livelihoods dependent on particular environmental
conditions.8
Although it is difficult to predict the full implications of climate
change on global and local fresh water resources or on the human and
natural environments, the forecasts are distressing. Already, shortages
attributed to climatic changes have resulted in record droughts in
Australia,9 southeastern and western United States, 0 southern Africa, and
South America. " Scientists are also blaming climatic changes for
intensifying rain activities in northern Europe and North American by
between 10% and 50% and for the related increase in flooding occurring
in many of these regions. 2
Both domestic and international water laws and policies are
inadequate to meet the challenges posed by this global phenomenon or to
adapt to the additional consequences that appear to be inevitable. Few
nations have implemented adequate measures designed to respond to the
8 See e.g., Early Monsoon Floods "Point to Climate Change", HUMANITARIAN NEWS AND
ANALYSIS, June 25, 2008, http.//www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=78925 (discussing
early monsoon floods effects on the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers and on Bangladesh).
Australia 's Drought to Worsen, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25617864/ (last visited 6-18-09) (discussing Australia's ongoing
and worst drought of the past century); See generally Neville Nicholls, Detecting and Attributing
Australian Climate Change, 55 AUSTL. METEOROLOGICAL MAG. 199 (2006).
'0 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 33, 43-44 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://www.globalchange.gov/publications/reports/scientific-assessments/us-impacts/download-
the-report [hereinafter US Global Climate Change] (providing a map with observed droughts
trends over the past 50 years, and concluding that "over the past several decades, extended dry
periods have become more frequent in parts of the United States, especially the Southwest and
the eastern United States").
See Sin Aqua Non, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 2009, at 59-61 (noting that "Australia has suffered
a decade-long drought. Brazil and South Africa, which depend on hydroelectric power, have
suffered repeated brownouts because there is not enough water to drive the turbines properly");
Pilirani Semu-banda, Africa: Climate Change Imperils Livelihoods on Zambezi River, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 26, 2008, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45224.
(considering the impacts of ongoing droughts on southern Africa and how climate change will
affect the region); M Marcela Valente, South America: Scientists Look at Climate Change and
Drought, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 13, 2009, available at
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45768. (discussing the ongoing drought in South America
and considering the likelihood that it is driven by climate change).
12 Mohammed H.I. Dore, Climate Change and Changes in Global Precipitation Patterns: What Do
We Know?, 31 ENv'T INT'L 1167, 1169, 1175 (2005). (reviewing the literature evidencing the
increase of precipitation in mid- and high-latitude regions, including northern North America and
Europe, resulting from climate change); see also Gerald Wynn, Floods, Heat Hit Europe, but is
it Global Warming?, REUTERS NEWS, July 26, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisislidUSL24785745. (discussing the ability to link recent
European floods to climate change).
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expected impacts on their domestic fresh waters. 3 Even fewer have
reached across their borders to coordinate efforts over shared fresh water
resources, a failure that is especially troubling because, with the
exception of most island-nations, nearly every country in the world is
hydrologically connected to its neighbors. 4
This paper examines international law and policy and the
collective ability of nations to respond to the effects of climate change on
global fresh water resources. It first explores the current and long-term
effects of climate change on regional and global fresh water resources
and the resulting impact on human and the natural environment. It then
assesses the international legal and policy challenges posed by climate
change, and identifies mechanisms that are likely to aid both individual
13 For articles addressing shortcomings in U.S. law and policy, see Noah D. Hall et al., Climate
Change and Freshwater Resources, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 30 (2008). (discussing the
inadequacy of U.S. law to respond to "the new challenges of climate change and resulting
pressures on freshwater resources"); Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationary is Dead"- Long Live
Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) available at http://ssm.com/abstract'1357766 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009)
[hereinafter Craig 1] (asserting that "American law and policy are not keeping up with climate
change impacts and the need for adaptation"). See generally John Leshy, Notes on a Progressive
National Water Policy, 3 HARVARD L. & POL'Y REV. 133 (2009) (identifying the shortcomings
of US water laws in relation to climate change and offering recommendations for enhancing
water policy and management). For discussions addressing shortcomings in European law and
policy See European Environment Agency, If the Well Runs Dry - Climate Change Adaptation
and Water, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.eea.europa.eu/articles/climate-change-adaptation-and-
water (noting that "[tihe integration of adaptation into key EU policies has been limited" and that
"only seven of the 32 EEA countries have actually adopted National Adaptation Strategies for
climate change"); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Econ. Com. for Europe, Water and
Adaptation to Climate Change, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/2009/4 2 (Sept. 1, 2009) available at
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2009/Wat/mp-wat/ECEMP WAT_2009_4_E.pdf
[hereinafter UNECE Guidance] (asserting that "Very few countries have developed adaptation
strategies so far. The fact that many water bodies, especially in the UNECE region, cross
boundaries means that risks and challenges are shared and that solutions therefore need to be
coordinated. Transboundary cooperation in developing adaptation strategies is currently,
however, almost non-existent").
'4 See Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary
Ground Water Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 201, 205 (2003)
[hereinafter Eckstein & Eckstein 2003a].Globally, there are 263 rivers that traverse or demarcate
international political boundaries and whose basins encompass territory in 145 countries. United
Nations Environmental Programme, Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements 1-2 (2002).
Under the auspices of the United National Environmental, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
an ongoing study has so far inventoried 273 international transboundary aquifers, of which 68
are found in the Americas, 38 in Africa, 65 in eastern Europe, 90 in western Europe, and 12 in
Asia. Press Release, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., UNESCO Publishes First
World Map of Underground Transboundary Aquifers, Release No. N'2008-108 (Oct. 22, 2008)
available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URLID%3 D43767&URLDO%3DDOTOPIC&URLSECTION%3D20 l.html.
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nations and the international community to meet the challenges posed by
this extraordinary global development. I5
It is noteworthy that the focus of the recommendations is on
state-to-state relations that require bilateral or multilateral
implementation rather than on steps that an individual state could take
unilaterally. Moreover, the suggestions are intended to foment resilience
and adaptive capacity in the system for managing transboundary water
resources in light of the expected, and unexpected, variability of climate
change. 6 While the recommendations offered are not presented to serve
as a blueprint for success, they do herald the obvious-climate change is
fundamentally a global phenomenon that defies borders and sovereignty.
Only through concerted and collective effort can nations surmount this
unprecedented global challenge; anything less will result in disjointed
efforts that exacerbate scarcity and water stress, globally and locally.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND FRESH WATER
RESOURCES
According to the IPCC, "[o]bservational records and climate
projections provide abundant evidence that freshwater resources are
vulnerable and have the potential to be strongly impacted by climate
change, with wide-ranging consequences on human societies and
ecosystems."' 7  This conclusion is easily understood given that the
hydrological cycle is inextricably connected to virtually all sectors of the
natural and human environments."8 Projected impacts offered by
'5 Although the paper does not address domestic legal or policy approaches that states might take
on their own, the legal and policy approaches proposed will certainly require considerable
domestic reforms.
16 Resilience refers to the capacity of humans, other life on Earth, and ecosystems to cope with and
respond to changes in the environment in a way that ensures survival. See generally Robin
Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common- Law Public
Trust Doctrines 15 n. 86 (FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 382, 2009),
available at http://ssm.con/abstract=1431663 [hereinafter Craig 2]. Adaptive capacity relates to
the ability of ecosystems, in the face of ever changing environmental and climatic conditions, to
regenerate and continue delivering resources and ecosystem services necessary for life and
societal development. See generally id.
'7 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 4.
18 See Jayashree Vivekanandan & Sreeja Nair, Climate Change and Water: Examining the
Interlinkages, in TROUBLED WATERS: CLIMATE CHANGE, HYDROPOLIT1CS, AND
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 1, 3 (D. Michel and A. Pandya eds. 2009), available at
http://www.stimson.org/rvproto/parner.cfm?SN=RV200902021934 (asserting that "any factor
Water Scarcity, Conflict and Security
scientists, non-governmental, and intergovernmental bodies on global
water resources vary widely in geographic impact and severity, and
range from increased precipitation that will trigger significant floods, to
decreases in rainfall that will produce long-term droughts. Coupled with
the existing and growing demand for fresh water resulting from
expanding populations and economic development, 9 changes in the
availability of fresh water could have serious and possibly devastating
implications for agricultural production, economic development, the
environment, human health, population growth, and power generation.2"
Many climate change proponents are now warning that the world is
heading toward a massive global water crisis.2' The following section
briefly reviews some of the climate change implications related to
transboundary fresh water resources.
A. DROUGHTS AND FLOODS
While climate change models suffer from a degree of
uncertainty, their conclusions are overwhelmingly consistent: climate
change will impact temperatures, precipitation rates, and the consistency
that triggers change in these variables would ripple through the sectors that are dependent on the
hydrological system").
'9 See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 176 (Martin
Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Climate Change 2007: Impacts] (noting that "[g]lobally,
demand for water is increasing as a result of population growth and economic development").
Between 1990 and 1995, fresh water withdrawals grew seven-fold, in part, because of the
expansion of irrigated agriculture. See PETER GLEICK, THE WORLD'S WATER 1998-1999, at 6
(1998). While per capita global water use has declined over the past few decades, aggregate
demand continues to grow due to population growth and economic development. Id. at 10-11.
According to Gleick, "[f]reshwater withdrawals increased from an estimated 580 cubic
kilometers per year (km 3/yr) in 1900 to 3,580 km3/yr in 1990" while the per capita rate of
withdrawal went from around 400 m3/p/yr in the early 1990s to a high of around 650 m3/p/yr in
the mid 1980s. Id.
20 See Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 6 (noting the threat to food security from dwindling
river flows); Z.W. Kundewicz, et al., The Implications of Projected Climate Change for
Freshwater Resources and their Management, 53 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 1, 5 (2008) (describing
the expected consequences of rising temperatures on glacial and snow melt and the impact on the
more than one billion people who live in river basins supplied by such water from major
mountain ranges, like the Himalaya, Hindukush and Andes).
21 See, e.g., William A. Jury & Henry J. Vaux, Jr., The Emerging Global Water Crisis: Managing
Scarcity and Conflict Between Water Users, 95 ADVANCED IN AGRONOMY 1, 3 (2007); MAUDE
BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMING BATTLE FOR THE
RIGHT TO WATER (The New Press 2008) (2007); FRED PEARCE, WHEN THE RIVERS RUN DRY:
WATER -THE DEFINING CRISIS OF THE 21 CENTURY (2006); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
[UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE
GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 136 (2006) [HEREINAFTER UNDP].
Vol. 27, No.3
Wisconsin International Law Journal
of precipitation events around the world, which, in turn, will result in
considerable climatic variability and change, including more intense and
frequent flood and drought events.22 Experts suggest that by the middle
of this century, annual average river runoff and water availability will
fall by 100/o-30% in the sub-tropics and mid-latitudes, and increase by
100/o-40% in the tropical regions and higher latitudes.23
In southern Africa, for example, scientists anticipate a sharp
decline in precipitation, between 10% and 20%, as compared with
average rainfall from the latter part of the 2 0 th century. 24 Such a drop is
expected to reduce perennial drainage of the region's rivers by as much
as 50% including, for example, in the Orange River. The mean annual
precipitation rate of the basin of the Orange River, which flows from
Lesotho to South Africa and then along South Africa's desert border with
Namibia, is approximately 400 mm, which characterizes the basin as
highly arid.25 While actual precipitation varies annually between 2,000
mm in the highlands at the river's source to less than 50 mm at its mouth,
evaporation rates range from 1,200 mm to 3,500 mm respectively. 26 As a
result, the Orange River is already in deficit and is considered closed for
purposes of further development. 27  A reduction of one-half of the
Orange River's perennial water supply in an already arid region will
further exacerbate existing shortages and elevate regional tensions.
Scientists also expect significant reductions in the annual mean
discharge by the end of the century in other transboundary river basins,
many of which are already under stress, including the Danube (decrease
of 21.9%), Euphrates (decrease of 38%), Rhine (decrease of 13.3%), Rio
Grande (decrease of 26.7%), and Syr Darya (decrease of 10.3%). 2' As a
22 See Lehner, supra note 3, at 274.
23 Kundzewicz, supra note 20, at 5.
24 Maarten de Wit et al., Changes in Surface Water Supply Across Africa with Predicted Climate
Change, 311 SCIENCE 1917, 1919(2006).
25 See id; see also A.H. Conley & P.H. van Niekerk, Sustainable Management of International
Waters: The Orange River Case, 2 WATER POL'Y 131, 132 (2000) (describing the downstream
region of the Orange River flows through the Namib Desert, which "is as dry as the Sahara").
26 See Conley and van Niekerk, supra, note 25, at 135.
27 Anthony R. Turton, A Southern African Perspective on Transboundary Water Resource
Management, ENVT'L CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REP., 2003, at 78, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/feature-turton.pdf; Al Conley, A Synoptic View of
Water Resources in Southern Africa, in SINK OR SWIM? WATER, RESOURCE SECURITY AND
STATE CO-OPERATION (Hussein Solomon ed., 1996), available at
http://www.iss.co.za/Monographs/No6/Conley.html.
28 Daisuke Nohara et al., Impact of Climate Change on River Discharge Projected by Multimodel
Ensemble, 7 J. OF HYDROMETEOROLOGY 1076, 1087 (2006) (projecting annual mean discharge
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result of declining precipitation, coupled with expected rising
temperatures, droughts that are today deemed extraordinary will soon
become the norm.29
In contrast, an increase in precipitation in the Mekong River
Basin, especially, as expected, in more volatile and pronounced rain
events, could result in unprecedented floods with devastating
consequences. According to the IPCC, during the second half of this
century, the maximum monthly flow of the Mekong River during the
rainy season is expected to intensify by more than 40% in the basin and
by nearly 20% in the delta." Moreover, the Panel suggests that a global
temperature rise of only 2°C will flood as much as 23%-29% more land
area than is currently inundated by seasonal deluges.31
River basins like the Mekong and Vistula are likely to endure
both increases and decreases in river flows that will result in both
flooding and scarcity condition. Such variations will occur seasonally, in
part, because of an overall increase in temperatures that will boost
precipitation during the wet season, and amplify evaporation in the dry
season. 32
These variations will also manifest through changes in glacial
and snowpack melt. Scientists project that rising temperatures will
intensify the melting of glaciers and snowpack33 causing flows in rivers
and lakes that are fed by these meltwaters, like those originating in the
of 24 rivers around the world as impacted by climate change using a very rapid economic growth
scenario with increasing globalization and a projected C02 concentration of 720 ppmv by the
year 2100). Precipitation reductions in Southern Europe are especially noteworthy as by 2070,
the current 100-year drought cycle is expected to occur, on average, every forty years, and in the
most extreme cases every ten years. See Lehner, supra note 3, at 290.
29 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 52 (noting that "by the 2070s, a 100-year drought of
today's magnitude is likely to return, on average, more frequently than every 10 years in parts of
Spain and Portugal, western France, Poland's Vistula Basin and western Turkey").
'0 Id. at 114 (projecting increases as compared to with levels from 1961-90).
" Id. at 52.
32 Id. at 114 (noting that the Mekong River will be at risk of increased flooding during the wet
season and increased water shortages in the dry season); See Lehner, supra note 3, at 294
(indicating that the Vistula River in eastern Poland will likely experience an increase in both
flood and drought frequencies as a result of changes in the seasonal variability of precipitation
and temperature that result in more extreme high and low-flow months).
33 Rising temperatures pose a two-fold problem for glaciers. It not only reduces the accumulation
period and increases the melting season, it also causes more of the region's precipitation to fall
as rain, rather than snow, which does not rebuild glaciers and snow pack and actually hastens
melting. Xu JIANCHU ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR INTEGRATED MOUNTAtN
DEVELOPMENT, THE MELTING HIMALAYAS: REGIONAL CHALLENGE AND LOCAL IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON MOUNTAIN ECOSYSTEMS AND LIVELIHOODS 4 (2007).
Vol. 27, No. 3 417
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high Himalayan and Andean mountain ranges, to increase over the
coming decades. Once the glacial and snowpack source is depleted,
though, river flows are expected to decline precipitously resulting in
regional water scarcities.34 Additionally, increased temperatures will
bring earlier and more voluminous spring melts, thereby affecting the
timing of peak stream flow and the downstream availability of water. "
Over time, as glaciers recede, snowcaps become depleted, and winter
precipitation shifts from snow to rain, many of these glacier and snow
pack-dependent regions will suffer further shortages and related
maladies.36 For example, by the third quarter of the current century,
summer low flows in Alps-fed central European rivers are projected to
decrease by as much as 50% and up to 80% in some southern European
rivers. "
Significant glacial loss and reduced snow cover has been already
observed around the globe. In the Peruvian Andes, for example, the
region covered by glaciers has been reduced by 25% over the past three
decades as a result of warming trends.36 By 2015, all Peruvian glaciers
34 Ashok Jaitly, South Asian Perspective on Climate Change and Water Policy, in TROUBLED
WATERS: CLIMATE CHANGE, HYDROPOLITICS, AND TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 17, 21
(David Michel & Amit Pandya eds., 2009), available at
http://www.stimson.org/rvproto/partner.cfm?SN=RV200902021934 (discussing the short-term
and long-term impact of accelerated glacial melt on South Asia);T. P. Barnett et.al., Potential
Impacts of a Warming Climate on Water Availability in Snow-Dominated Regions, 438 NATURE
303, 306 (Nov. 2005) (noting that "some areas of the most populated regions on Earth are likely
to 'run out of water' during the dry season if the current warming and glacial melting trends
continue for several more decades" and that "when the glaciers melt and their fossil water is used
or lost, their contribution to the water supply of the region will cease"); JIANCHU ET AL., supra
note 33, at 7.
35 The impact of glacial and snowpack melt is especially concerning because glaciers and
snowpacks serve as fresh water storage reservoirs for downstream reaches of river and lake
basins. See Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 6. Over eons, human activity and the natural
environment have become dependent on the recurring seasonal cycles of spring and summer
meltwaters to sustain agriculture and development, as well as the multitude of species and
habitats found in the basins. Global warming-induced changes to this cycle could have serious
and possibly devastating implications for agricultural production, economic development, power
generation, population growth, and the environment. Id. See also Kundzewicz, supra note 20, at
5 and accompanying text.
36 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 40, 42. A study reported by the IPCC, which simulated
glacial melt in 11 glaciers around the world, indicated an average volume loss of 60% by 2050.
Id. at 37.
31 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 125 (describing the expected declines in European river
flows in the text and in Table 5.4). Similar impacts are projected for the seven major rivers fed
from Himalayan glaciers - the Brahmaputra, Gandes, Indus, Irrawady, Mekong, Salween, and
Yagtze. See Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 6.
38 See Bamett et al, supra note 34, at 306.
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below 5,500 meters are expected to disappear as a result of rising
temperatures.39 Similarly, in the Tibetan Plateau of the Himalayas, the
glaciated area has shrunken 5.5% over the past 45 years with glacial
recession rates averaging between 4 and 65 meters annually." By 2050,




B. AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY
Agricultural production in much of the world is critically
dependent on the regularity of the hydrological cycle and the degree to
which humans have become accustomed to that cycle. 2  This
dependency includes the timing of precipitation and glacial and
snowpack melts, as well as the location where water is delivered and the
volumes of water made available by the rains, glaciers, snows, rivers and
aquifers.4 1 Moreover, more than one-sixth of the world's population
lives in basins that are critically dependent on glacial and snowmelt
water to carry them through the dry season. 44
Any changes to the delicate hydrologic balance could result in
serious and devastating impacts to the ability of farmers and nations to
produce sustainable levels of food and fiber and, ultimately, on food
security.45 In particular, changes in the timing and volume of seasonal
39 DAN SMITH & JANANI VIVEKANANDA, INTERNATIONAL ALERT, A CLIMATE OF CONFLICT: THE
LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE AND WAR 14 (2007).
40 THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG., THE UNITED NATIONS
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3: WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD 196 (2009)
[hereinafter UNDR3]. Similarly, the glaciated area of Tien Shan region in Central Asia has
contracted by 10.1% over the past 30 years. Id.
" Climate Change 2007: Impacts, supra note 19, at 492.
42 See UNDR3, supra note 40, at 112 (noting that "Agriculture is... extremely sensitive to climate
change, and it is anticipated that large areas of croplands, in particular in semi-arid zones, will
need to adapt to new conditions with lower precipitation"). Agriculture accounts for 70% of
water globally withdrawals from rivers, lakes and aquifers, and up to 90% in some developing
countries. Id. at 99 and 106.
4" Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 5-6 (noting that reductions in annual runoff "could
cause a significant drop in productivity in agriculture and other climate-sensitive sectors").
4 See Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 6; Kundzewicz, supra note 20, at 5 and
accompanying text.
45 See Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 6 (noting the threat to food security from dwindling
river flows and that that "[m]any parts of Central Asia, Latin America, and South Asia depend
on glaciers for their livelihoods and sustenance"); Kundzewicz, supra note 20, at 5 and
accompanying text; (describing the expected consequences of rising temperatures on glacial and
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flows could disrupt growing cycles in ways that that would make
adaptation difficult. For example, the delivery of water in large,
unpredictable bursts, rather than periodic or consistent flows, could make
agricultural planning considerably more challenging. Similarly,
significant reductions in river flows, as expected in many of the rivers
originating in the Alps, Andes, and Himalayan mountain ranges, could
make current crops unsustainable.46 Crop yields, for example, are
projected to decline by as much as 30% in parts of Central and South
Asia, and even higher in the United States, as a result of climate
change.47
Such climatic variations could make it difficult for nations to
meet their food needs into the future. Current patterns indicate that the
global community will have to double its food production by mid-
century to meet the food needs of the nine billion people expected to live
on this planet by 2050.48 Such an increase undoubtedly will require
either considerable improvements in water use efficiency or an increase
in the supply of water for agriculture, industry, and municipal use, or
some combination of both. The expected changes to the hydrologic
cycle, though, will likely make such adaptation goals exceedingly
difficult to achieve.
C. HUMAN HEALTH
Scientists and experts with the United Nations expect changes in
the hydrological cycle ensuing from climatic changes to multiply the
snow melt and the impact the more than one billion people who live in river basins supplied by
such water from major mountain ranges, like the Himalaya, Hindukush and Andes).
46 See UNDR3, supra note 40, at 112 (asserting that "Climate change is expected to alter
hydrologic regimes and patterns of freshwater resource availability" and pointing out some of the
agricultural challenges expected from climate change in the Mediterranean basin and semi-arid
regions of Southern Africa, Australia and the Americas).
47 See Climate Change 2007: Impacts, supra note 19, at 479-80; Wolfram Schlenker and Michael J.
Roberts, Nonlinear Temperature Effects Indicate Severe Damages to U.S. Crop Yields Under
Climate Change, 106 PROC. OF NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. E120 (2009), available at
http://www.agcarbonmarkets.com/documents/PNAS2009_Final.pdf (providing new evidence
that by the end of the century, crop yields in the United States may decline by 30-46% under the
slowest warming scenario, and decrease by 63-82% under the more rapid warming scenario).
48 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE BUBBLE IS CLOSE TO BURSTING: A FORECAST FOR THE MAIN
ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL WATER ISSUES LIKELY TO ARISE IN THE WORLD DURING THE
NEXT Two DECADES 21 (2009).
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number of human health maladies including death,49 especially in lesser-
developed countries.5" Such health effects will occur through water-
borne and vector-borne diseases, especially in countries where
precipitation increases and flooding events overwhelm existing sewer
and treatment systems. 1 As a result, bacteria, parasites and algal blooms
will flourish, including the protozoan parasites Cryptosporidium,
hepatitis A viruses, E. coli bacteria, and more than 100 other pathogens. 2
International organizations, like the World Health Organization (WHO),
estimate that globally, malnutrition causes the annual deaths of 5.62
million children under the age of five, while diarrheal diseases take the
lives of another 1.8 million young children each year. 3 Overall, nearly
three million deaths annually can be directly attributed to inadequate and
impure water, improper sanitation, and improper hygiene. 4
As temperatures rise, many experts expect vector-borne diseases
like malaria and dengue fever to expand their geographic range into
49 Kari Lydersen, Risk of Disease Rises with Water Temperatures, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2008,
at A08; see generally UNDR3, supra note 40, at 73 (stating that "Climate change can affect
health through multiple pathways, such as greater frequency and intensity of heat waves, fewer
cold-related illnesses, increased floods and droughts, changes in the distribution of vectorborne
diseases and effects on the risk of disasters and malnutrition").
50 UNDR3, supra note 40, at 73 (asserting that "populations in low-income countries are likely to
be particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects" of climate change).
5' KURT M. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 63 (2007), available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageofconsequences.pdf. In the United States, for
example, the sewer systems of more than 700 cities in northern states regularly overflow into
municipal water supplies during heavy rain events, mixing sewage water and clean water.
Lydersen, supra note 49. Much of the developing world, where the vast majority of the world's
population is found, has no functioning sewer or water treatment facilities. UNICEF & WHO,
MEETING THE MDG DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION TARGET: A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT
OF PROGRESS 6 (2004), available at
http://www.who.int/watersanitation-health/monitoring/jmp04.pdf (estimating that 2.6 billion
people in the world lack adequate sanitation services); WHO, HEALTH THROUGH SAFE
DRINKING WATER AND BASIC SANITATION,
http://www.who.int/water sanitationhealth/mdgl/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2009)
(noting that 2.6 billion people - half the developing world - lack even a simple 'improved'
latrine).
52 Lydersen, supra note 49.
53 See UNDR3, supra note 40, at 88 (stating that "In 2000 diarrhea accounted for 17% of the 10.6
million deaths in children younger than five... Undernutrition is an underlying cause of 53% of
all deaths in children younger than five"); See also World Health Organization, Burden of
Disease and Cost-Effectiveness Estimates,
http://www.who.int/watersanitation-health/diseases/burden/en/index.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2009).
4 See UNDR3, supra note 40, at 89 (providing breakdown of statistics in Table 6.3).
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regions that previously had been inhospitable to them.5 The WHO
suggests that climate change-related warming and precipitation trends
since the mid-1970s have already caused more than 150,000 deaths
annually. 6 By 2030, the number of deaths directly related to climate
change is expected to grow to 300,000 per year. 7 Moreover, global
warming has been linked to food-borne infectious diseases; 30% of
reported cases of salmonellosis in continental Europe have been linked to
episodes of higher than average temperatures. 8
In addition, flooding and drought also could drastically affect
human health. More than seven million people have died from flooding
since 1900, while those who suffered ill health, personal tragedies and
property losses number in the multiple billions of people. 9 Notably, the
incidence of deaths and people affected by floods is rising as a result of
more frequent deluges occurring in recent decades, as well as a greater
vulnerability to flooding events.
60
Similarly, a reduction in precipitation coupled with a rise in
temperature will also take a toll on human health. The heat wave that
ravaged Europe during the summer of 2003, which was responsible for
55 See, e.g., Matthew Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer World,
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61, 74 (2007); Frank C. Tanser et al., Potential Effect of Climate Change on
Malaria Transmission in Africa, 362 LANCET 1792, 1797 (2003) (finding a correlation between
climate change and a rise in malaria in Africa that projects a 5%-7% increase of altitudinal
exposure to malaria with an accompanying 16-28% increase in overall exposure by 2100);
Jonathan Patz, Impact of Regional Climate Change on Human Health, 438 NATURE 310, 311
(2005) (noting infectious agents such as protozoa, bacteria and viruses and their associated
vector organisms have reproduction and survival highly impacted by temperature).
56 Patz, supra note 55, at 313.
57 Andrew Jack, Climate toll 'to Double Within 25 Years, FINANCIAL TIMES Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/054ffT7ca-f282-1 Idb-a454-000b5dfl 0621 .html?nclickcheck = 1.
58 Patz, supra note 55, at 311 (noting also that "[i]n the UK, the monthly incidence of food
poisoning is most strongly associated with the temperatures occurring in the previous two to five
weeks").
9 Heather Cooley, Floods and Droughts, in THE WORLD WATER 2006-2007 at 91, 106-08 (Peter
Gleick ed. 2006).
6o See Id. See also See also UN ECON. COMM'N FOR EUROPE, GUIDANCE ON WATER AND
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, ECONOMIC 7 (2009) [hereinafter UNECE Guidance on
Water and Climate Change], available at
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2009/Wat/mp wat/ECE MP.WAT_30_E.pdf. (noting that
between 2000-2006, the global frequency of disaster resulting from "extreme climate events"
increased by 187% as compared with the previous decade; between 2000-2008, disasters from
"extreme climate events" caused the deaths of 33,000 people and affected another 1.6 billion,
and resulted in more than US$25 billion in global economic damages).
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between 22,000-45,000 heat-related deaths, is but a warning of the types
of maladies that will likely beleaguer humanity in the coming decades. 6'
D. ECOSYSTEMS, HABITATS AND SPECIES
Another consequence of climate change will be its impact on
ecosystems and habitats worldwide. Predictions of the effects of climate
change on terrestrial biodiversity suggest that over the next 50 years,
between 15% and 37% of terrestrial species will become extinct.62
Recent studies indicate that warming waters could result in the loss of up
to 40% of Northwest salmon and 60% of western trout populations in the
United States.63 Another study predicts a loss of fish biodiversity as high
as 75% by 2070 in 52 rivers around the world due to a reduction in river
discharges, especially where combined with an increase in consumptive
human uses.64
Projected climate change consequences are not limited only to
changes in water temperatures and volumes. Scientists also expect
significant impacts on the physical, chemical, and biological traits of
fresh water ecosystems worldwide. 65  This is evidenced by already-
documented changes that show rising temperatures in surface waters of
lakes and rivers, warming hypolimnetic layers of large lakes, retreating
ice-cover in northern and high altitude lakes, decreasing stream flows
and lake levels in southern regions, changing chemical and biological
characteristics of lakes at various elevations, and variations in life-cycles
and geographical ranges of certain species.66 These changes in the
61 Patz, supra note 55, at 310; WHEN WARMING AFFECTS HEALTH, supra note 5, at 46 (asserting
that "as average temperatures climb, there will be more frequent and longer heat waves of the
sort that contributed to the death of at least 20,000 Europeans in August 2003").
62 See Chris Thomas et.al., Extinction Risk From Climate Change 427 NATURE 145 (2004). See
also Bryan Walsh, The New Age of Extinction, TIME, Apr. 13, 2009, at 43-50 (describing the
impact of climate change on species survival and extinction and suggesting that as many as 20-
30% of all species on Earth may disappear by the end of the century).
63 See US Global Climate Change Impacts, supra note 10, at 87.
6' See Marguerite Xenopoulos et al., Scenarios of Freshwater Fish Extinctions From Climate
Change and Water Withdrawal, 1I GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 1557, 1561 (2005).
65 See generally Jani Heino et al., Climate Change and Freshwater Biodiversity: Detected Patterns,
Future Trends and Adaptations in Northern Regions, 84 BIOLOGICAL REV. 39 (2009); Craig 2,
supra note 16, at 12 (noting that an increase in water temperatures also affects the chemical
reactivity of water and its components and explains that warmer waters reduce a water body's
ability to hold dissolved oxygen and, thereby, its ability to support animal life).
66 See Rick Battarbee, Climate Change and Projection on Water Quality Changes in Europe
Aquatic Ecosystem Responses to Climate Change: Past, Present and Future, in INTERNATIONAL
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characteristics of fresh water ecosystems have already had, and will
continue to have, a drastic effect on flora and fauna, especially species
that are environmentally sensitive and limited in their ability to migrate
or adapt.67
Regions that the IPCC projects to endure higher water
temperatures and increased precipitation will likely see an increase in
water pollution from sedimentation, nutrients, agricultural chemicals, and
dissolved organized substances.68 As a result, algal blooms, bacteria, and
fungi content will flourish, further challenging sensitive species and
altering the delicate balance of ecosystems and habitats.69
An increase in the intensity of rain events will foster soil erosion,
which will increase the volume of suspended solids in lakes and
reservoirs.7" According to the IPCC, this will result in greater amounts
of pathogens and other dissolved pollutants being transported to surface
and ground waters and will further degrade water quality. The more
intense rainfall also could tax existing sewer and water treatment
facilities, thereby allowing polluted water into the environment.7'
E. WATER, SECURITY, AND CONFLICT
The link between water and a nation's security has long been
argued to be a potential source of international conflict: "Because
international freshwater is shared, unequally divided, scarce, and has the
potential of being mismanaged, nations often have two choices: conflict
or cooperation."72 In January 2008, while addressing business leaders at
the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, UN Secretary
WORKSHOP: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE WATER CYCLE, RESOURCES AND QUALITY
RESEARCH-POLICY INTERFACE - SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY REPORT 71 (Moren-Abat, Marta, et al.
eds., 2007), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=I 0.1.1.113.178&rep=rep I &type=pdf#page=7
1.
67 See IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 53; cf Xenopoulos, supra note 64, at 1557
(describing the potential impact of climate change on fresh water fish).
68 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 53.
69 Id. at 53.
70 Id. at 54.
71 id.
72 Shlomi Dinar, Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation, 22 SAIS REV. 229, 248 (2002); see
also Jaitly, supra note 34, at 27 (asserting that "[c]onventional wisdom suggests that distribution
of natural resources in the context of scarcity conditions would in all probability create a conflict
situation").
Water Scarcity, Conflict and Security
General Ban Ki-moon cautioned that water scarcity could spell an
increase in future conflicts, and added that "[p]opulation growth will
make the problem worse. So will climate change. As the global
economy grows, so will its thirst. Many more conflicts lie just over the
horizon."73
Between 1800 and 1995, the global per capita availability of
water declined from an annual 40,000 m 3 per person to 6840 m 3 per
person merely as a result in the growth of human population; by 2025, it
is estimated to decrease further to 4692 m 3 per person.7 4 Geographically,
though, water is very poorly distributed-in patterns that do not correlate
with population size or needs. For example, while Canada enjoys an
enviable annual availability of 91,420 m 3 of water for each of its 32
million citizens, Algeria, which has a similar sized population, has a
mere 440 m 3 per year for each of its citizens.7 5  Moreover, while
countries in the Middle East and North Africa are home to 5% of the
world's population, they possess less than 1% of the world's usable fresh
water resources.76
While population growth and development are principal factors
in assessing per capita availability of water in the future,77 scientists
73 UN News Centre, At World Economic Forum, Ban Ki-moon Pledges Action on Water Resources,
Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=25398&Cr-davos&Crl. It is
noteworthy that the Secretary General's predecessor, Kofi Annan, warned in 2001 that "fierce
competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future." David
Michel, A River Runs Through It: Climate Chance, Security Challenges, and Shared Water
Resources, in TROUBLED WATERS: CLIMATE CHANGE, HYDROPOLITICS, AND TRANSBOUNDARY
RESOURCES 73, 76 (D. Michel and A. Pandya eds., 2009), available at
http://www.stimson.org/rvproto/partner.cfm?SN=RV200902021934.
7' Nils Petter Gledistch et al., Conflict Over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy
Boundaries, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 361, 363 (2006) (describing the dwindling availability of
water resources as a function of the growing global human population, albeit incorrectly in terms
of "runoff" rather than total [surface and ground water] fresh water resources); UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, VITAL WATER GRAPHICS (2008),
http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article28.html (noting that global water availability
decreased from 12,900 m3 per capita per year in 1970, to 9,000 m3 in 1990, and to less than
7,000 m3 in 2000, and that availability is projected to drop to 5,100 m3 per capita per year by
2025).
75 UNITED NATIONS, WATER: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY - THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2, at 132 (2006) (detailing the annual per capita availability of water for
every nation on Earth).
76 See Gleditsch, supra note, at 363.
77 Paul R. Hensel et.al., Conflict management of Riparian Disputes 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 383, 386
(2006) (citing to various scholars who suggest that the growth in the global population and
economic activity, including agricultural production, will decrease the availability of fresh water
and increase the potential for conflict).
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expect climate change to exacerbate the inequity of water availability and
distribution. Over the next 40 years, experts predict that climate change-
induced water scarcity will affect river discharge in every populated
basin on the planet.78 As noted above, the perennial drainage of the
Orange River in southern Africa, as well as many of the Alps-fed central
European rivers, are expected to decline by one-half" and of the
Euphrates by more than one-third.8" By 2030, nearly one-half of the
world's population will live in areas suffering from high water stress,
most of which will be found in the developing world.8'
A lack of adequate water supplies could have a significant
impact on the ability of people and nations to ensure their economic and
social development as well as to maintain their accustomed standard of
living.82 Reduced precipitation and water flows could enhance droughts
and scarcity, thereby diminishing agricultural productivity, endangering
public health, impacting migration and settlement patterns, and placing
considerable strain on livelihood and social well-being. Similarly,
increased rain events and water flows could produce destructive floods
that jeopardize human lives, raze crops and habitats, force human
relocation, and damage the social fabric of communities. As a result,
78 Michel, supra note 73, at 73.
79 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 34. See generally supra note 25 and accompanying text.
81 Michel, supra note 73 at 73 (noting that by 2030, approximately 3.9 billion people, mostly in the
developing world, will live in basins experiencing high water stress); UNDP, supra note 21, at
136 (suggesting that by 2025, "more than 3 billion people could be living in water-stressed
countries"). While there are various standards to define water stress, the Falkenmark water stress
index is one of the more widely accepted standards. Using a per capita minimum of 100 liters per
day for basic health and household needs (s.a., cooking, drinking, and washing), and then
allocating a multiplier to account for agriculture, industry, and energy production, this scale
suggests that at a level of 1,700 M3/person/year, water problems are unlikely. It then defines
moderate water stress as ranging between 1,700 and 1,000 m3/person/year; and high water stress
as below 1,000 m3/person/year. High water stress is described as chronic water shortages that
negatively impacts human health, economic development, and general well-being. Below 500
m3/person/year, the level of water stress is considered a serious constraint on human life and
development. See Malin Falkenmark, The Massive Water Shortage in Africa: Why isn't it Being
Addressed? 18 AMBIO 112, 115-16 (1989); see also Malin Falkenmark & Carl Widstrand,,
Population and Water Resources, 47 POPULATION BULL. 2, 19, 25 (1992)
82 Campbell, supra note 51, at 56. Campbell asserts that:
"In the developing world, even a relatively small climatic shift can trigger or exacerbate food
shortages, water scarcity, destructive weather events, the spread of disease, human migration,
and natural resource competition. These crises are all the more dangerous because they are
interwoven and self-perpetuating: water shortages can lead to food shortages, which can lead to
conflict over remaining resources, which can drive human migration, which, in tum, can create
new food shortages in new regions." Id.
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competition for fresh water resources could spur confrontation in an
effort to ensure survival.8 3 A number of scholars, and even the UN
General Secretary, have suggested that water-based, and possibly climate
change-related, conflicts have already manifested in places like Darfur. 4
The Nile River Basin is one area that may be particularly
sensitive to climate-induced water scarcity. 95% of the fresh water
reaching Egyptian soil originates outside that country's borders, while
86% of the Nile's waters originate in the Ethiopian Highlands where
climate change impacts on the El Nino cycle are still unclear.85
Moreover, United Nations projections for the region indicate that
between 2005 and 2050, Egypt's population will expand from 77 million
to 129 million, while Ethiopia will grow from 74 million to nearly 174
million. 86
The overlay of climate change on this already water-stressed
region could further aggravate the basin's historically strained relations.
According to the IPCC, between 1972 and 1987, the Nile River basin
experienced a reduction in runoff of 20% and numerous interruptions in
hydropower generation resulting from severe droughts.87 Moreover, in
its First National Communication to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the Egyptian Government stated that by 2050 climate
change could deteriorate productive agricultural lands in Egypt to the
83 See Id. at 60 (asserting that "water scarcity.., shapes the geopolitical order when states engage
in direct competition with neighbors over shrinking water supplies); Michel, supra note 73, at
74.
8 See Mohamed Hamid, Climate Change in the Arab World: Threats and Responses, in TROUBLED
WATERS, supra note 18, at 45, 49. Similarly, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has argued
that the Darfur crisis "grew at least in part from desertification, ecological degradation, and a
scarcity of resources, foremost among them water." Ban Ki-moon, What I Saw in Darfur:
Untangling the Knots of a Complex Crisis, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2007, at A13.
85 Michel, supra note 73, at 75; see also Meehl, supra note 3, at 780 (explaining that "there are no
clear indications at this time regarding future changes in El Niio amplitude in a warmer
climate"); THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, INITIAL NATIONAL COMMUNICATION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, 74-5 (1999), available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/egyncl.pdf [hereinafter
Egypt's UNFCCC Report]. But see M. E. Elshamy et al., Impacts of Climate Change on Blue
Nile Flows using Bias-corrected GCM Scenarios. 13 HYDROL. EARTH SYS. SCI. 551, 562 (2009)
(concluding that despite a lack of consensus related to precipitation forecasts for the region,
seventeen climate change models applied to river flows of the Blue Nile consistently predicted a
rise in temperature of 2-5' C with an accompanying increase in evapotranspiration of 20/-14%,
suggesting a substantial decrease in upper Blue Nile flows by the end of the current century).
86 UN POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2008 REVISION (2009),
available at http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=l.
87 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION & VULNERABILITY 496-97 (James J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001), available at
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc-tar/?src-/climate/ipcc jar/wg2/index.htm.
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extent that the country's production of barley, wheat, maize, sorghum,
and soybean will decline between 18% and 27%." 8 A reduction in
Egypt's principal source of fresh water could exacerbate that situation
and further strain regional tensions.89
Similarly, in the eastern Mediterranean, one of the world's most
water-scarce regions, experts suggest that climate change will act as a
"threat multiplier - exacerbating water scarcity and tensions over water
within and between nations linked by hydrological resources, geography,
and shared political boundaries."9 Studies indicate that by 2050, rainfall
in the eastern Mediterranean will decline 10-/o25%, as compared to
current mean values.9 Coupled with the expected rise in temperature
and evaporation, experts assert that average storage volume of surface
reservoirs in Israel will fall 25% by the end of the century.92
Additionally, what rain does arrive will occur in intense rain events that
will intensify surface runoff and soil erosion, causing an increase in the
sedimentation of reservoirs and channels.93
Already, the effort by Israel and Jordan to "find" an additional
50 million cubic meters of potable water for Jordan has fallen by the
wayside because of a decline in rainfall in the region.94  With
precipitation projected to fall by an additional 20% or more by the end of
the century, evapotranspiration expected to rise by nearly 10%, and the
88 See Egypt's UNFCCC Report, supra note 85, at 64.
89 Cf Michael Klare, The New Geography of Conflict, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2001, at 49, 53-5
(identifying the Nile River Basin as one of several "Possible Flash Point for Regional Conflict" -
"where conflict is likely to erupt over access to or the possession of vital" natural resources);
James R. Lee, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ARMED CONFLICT 133 (2009) (asserting that "[tihere
appears to be an inevitable collision between Egypt's need for water, as a downstream user, and
rising needs upstream to satisfy growing populations in ,,, Ethiopia. There is simply not enough
water to go around... The day will come when Egypt will use military force in ... Ethiopia to
guarantee its Nile River water").
90 Friemuth, L. et al., Climate Change: A New Threat to Middle East Security, Prepared for the
United Nations Climate Change Conference, Indonesia , Bali (EcoPeace / Friends of the Earth
Middle East, December 2007).
9i See Ragab Ragab & Christel Prudhomme, Climate Change and Water Resources Management in
Arid and Semi-arid Regions, 81 BIOSYSTEMS ENG'G 3, 17-18 (2002) (reporting that rainfall in
the dry summer season will decline 20-25%, and 10-15% during the winter wet period, as
compared with current mean values).
92 See ISRAEL, FIRST NATIONAL COMMUNICATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 94 (2000), available at:
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/isrnci.pdf.By 2050, the temperature in the region is likely to
rise between 2 and 2.75°C. Ragab & Prudhomme, supra note 91, at 3.
13 See ISRAEL, supra note 92, at 93-94.
9 Friemuth, supra note 90, at 16; Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, Annex II, Water Related Matters,
available at: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peace-annexli.html.
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continuously growing populations, the region's water stress could
escalate in coming years.95 As the late King Hussein of Jordan stated,
water is the one issue "that could drive the nations of this region to
war."
96
Climate variability on international boundaries is another
potential consequence of global climate change with security and conflict
implications. 97 Floods and droughts, for example, could substantially
alter the natural flow routes of rivers, sometimes in sudden avulsive
alterations, but often in gradual accretive changes. 9 In areas where
rivers and lakes provide the framework for political boundaries, those
changes to river routes and lake contours can affect international borders
and, as a result, raise tensions over territory as well as access and rights
to water resources. 99
In a similar vein, droughts also could impact international
boundaries by depleting waters in transboundary rivers and lakes. The
case of Lake Chad is illustrative. Over the past few decades, the lake has
drastically shrunk in size and volume as a result of human withdrawals
and climatic changes. Because the international boundary is demarcated
in relation to the tripoint in the lake where the frontiers of Cameroon,
Chad and Nigeria meet, changes to its geographical size affect the
tripoint location. The lack of a definitive and stationary border has
caused citizens from neighboring countries to cross borders, often
'5 See Friemuth, supra note 90, at 13; Klare, supra note 89, Cf Lee, supra note 91 at 136.
6 See GEORGE McGOVERN, THE THIRD FREEDOM: ENDING HUNGER IN OUR TIME 119 (2001).
97 See Gleditsch, supra note 75, at 365 (describing a number of international conflicts resulting
from disputes over "fuzzy" river boundaries).
Avulsion is the abrupt and non-continuous movement of a river caused by natural conditions,
such as storms, while accretion is the lateral movement of a river that occurs gradually and
continuously over time, as may be caused by natural erosion. See JOHN O'BRIEN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 (2001).
9 Under international law, abrupt changes due to storms and other natural phenomena - known as
avulsion - do not affect a political boundary, which remains in the old channel. In contrast,
gradual and natural changes - termed accretion - can legally increase or decrease a state's
territory notwithstanding sovereignty. See id at 206. Notwithstanding, while the international law
on changes by avulsion and accretion may be settled, it may be an entirely different matter where
the changes are induced by climate change. If climate change is indeed a product of human
action, there may be grounds to question whether climate change-induced changes to rivers
routes constitute accretion. On the one hand, the changes may be described as gradual and
natural; on the other, they have an unnatural and indirect source. Similarly, abrupt climate-
induced changes may not constitute avulsion where they too have a human origin.
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inadvertently, to fish and forage for resources, which has resulted in
disputes. "'
Somewhat reassuring is the work of various scholars suggesting
that historically, water has been more often a source of cooperation than
of conflict.'' These studies indicate that, with the exception of Western
Europe, arid regions are not less cooperative than other climatic regions
of the world. 1°2 Yet, statistical research and historical analysis do not
always provide adequate predictors of human nature. Conventional
wisdom suggests that all peoples and nations have breaking points and
may resort to violence when faced with significant water depletion and
scarcity.'03 Moreover, there is compelling evidence that civilizations can
collapse because of resource depletion and environmental and climatic
changes. '04
Ultimately, the challenge of water scarcity coupled with the
consequences of climate change could create considerable security
problems for nations around the world, especially those already enduring
'oo See Ernest Waititu, Diminishing Water Resources Threaten Peace: Scarcity Fosters Conflicts,
WASH. TIMES, May 26, 2009, at A3.
101 See, e.g., Shira Yoffe et al., Conflict and Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources:
Indicators of Basins at Risk, 39 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1109, 1112 (2003) (suggesting
that the analysis indicates that between 1948 and 1999, "cooperation over water, including the
signing of treaties, far outweighed conflict over water and violent conflict in particular. Of 1,831
events, 28 percent were conflictive (507 events), 67 percent were cooperative (1,228), and the
remaining 5 percent were neutral or nonsignificant"); Campbell, supra note 51, at 60 (contending
that "water wars" are unlikely because "[w]ater does not have the economic value of a globally
traded strategic commodity like oil, and to reap significant benefit from a military operation
would require capturing an entire watershed, cutting supply to the population currently
dependent upon it, and then protecting the watershed and infrastructure from sabotage"); Ima
van der Molen & Antoinette Hildering, Water: Cause for Conflict or Co-operation?, 1 ISYP J
SCI. & WORLD AFF. 133, 140 (2005) ("water appears to pose a reason for transboundary co-
operation rather than for war, often preventing escalation instead of causing it").
102 See e.g., Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, supra note 101, at 1119 (noting the absence of a "relationship
between climate and water conflict/cooperation in a basin").
103 See Jaitly, supra note 34, at 27. Although based more on his personal experience rather than
historical analysis, Ismail Serageldin, former vice president of The World bank and first chair of
the Global Water Partnership, bluntly declared in 1995 that "If the wars of this century were
fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water." Philip Hirsch, Governing
Water as a Common Good in the Mekong River Basin: Issues of Scale, I TRANSFORMING
CULTURES EJOURNAL 104 (2006),
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/joumals/index.php/TfC/article/view/256/254; see also Michel, supra
note 73, at 76 (quoting former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he was yet
Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs as stating that "[t]he next war in the Middle East
will be fought over water, not politics").
'04 See generally JOSEPH A. TAINTER, THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES 44-45 1990
(describing generally the link between resources depletion and the collapse of civilizations).
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a lack of adequate fresh water resources. The link between water and a
nation's security cannot be underestimated. When faced with the threat
of demise, it is inevitable that people will fight for their survival and
stand against anyone whose actions might challenge their existence. As
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned in 2007:
The adverse effects of changing weather patterns, such as floods and
droughts, and related economic costs, including compensation for lost
land, could risk polarizing society and marginalizing communities. This,
in turn, could weaken the institutional capacity of the State to resolve
conflict through peaceful and democratic means, to ensure social
cohesion, and to safeguard human rights.'05
III. ADAPTING TO WATER-RELATED IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change will have considerable and unprecedented
impacts on the supply, availability, and demand of water resources
globally. This, in turn, will have serious effects on people and the
environment worldwide. Humanity's ability to tolerate these
consequences and to provide some measure of security for its natural
surroundings will be directly related to its capacity to respond to the
expected changes.
Although mitigation measures are clearly necessary components
of any climate change initiative, many of the expected consequences are
now inevitable.0 6 Hence, any initiative that strives to formulate an
105 See Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Sec. General, Statement at the Security Council Debate on Energy,
Security and Climate (April 17, 2007), available at:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/searchfull.asp?statlD=79#. In that same
address, during a UN Security Council debate on the impact of climate change on peace and
security, the Secretary General also offered "alarming, though not alarmist" examples in which
climate change could have implications for peace and security and risk possible conflict:
Extreme weather events and natural disasters, such as floods and drought, increase the risk of
humanitarian emergencies, and thus the risk of instability and dislocation.
Migration driven by factors, such as climate change could deepen tensions and conflicts,
particularly in regions with large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees.
Scarce resources, especially water and food, could help transform peaceful competition into
violence.
Limited or threatened access to energy is already known to be a powerful driver of conflict.
Our changing planet risk making it more so. Id.
'06 See Kundzewicz, supra note 20, at 6 (noting that "we are already committed... to further
warming and corresponding water-related impacts. It is therefore necessary to adapt to changes
in the volume, timing and quality of water").
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adequate response to climate change impacts must include adaptive
strategies."7 Without minimizing the need for mitigation efforts, the
remainder of this article will focus on legal and policy approaches
nations can and should pursue in order to adapt to the coming changes.
These proposals focus on state-to-state initiatives that require bilateral or
multilateral implementation rather than solely domestic, unilateral action.
They are intended to infuse resilience into and expand the adaptive
capacity of the current transboundary water management system as a
way to prepare for and respond to the expected, and unexpected,
variability of climate change.
The need for resilience and adaptive capacity is a direct
outgrowth of the unpredictability, the dynamic nature, and the
irreversibility of climate change."0 8 The unpredictable character of
climate change is manifest in our ongoing inability to formulate clear and
constructive projections of the changes currently underway.' 9
According to the experts, those changes will continue into the
foreseeable future, and beyond, and evidence the pervasive dynamism in
store."0 Moreover, and more ominous, is the extreme improbability of
returning to some level of climatic "normalcy."'' . Hence, there is
107 See Craig 2, supra note 16, at 15 (asserting that "Climate change adaptation will be necessary for
at least the next several decades, and probably centuries"); UNECE Guidance on Water and
Climate Change, supra note 60, at II (explaining that "[a]daptation to climate change is
consequently indispensable and urgent since the climate is already changing in some respects,
and mitigation will take too long to show effects).
Mitigation and adaptation are both important responses to global climate change. The difference
between the two actions are described by Craig as: "whereas mitigation efforts focus on shaping
human behavior to reduce the ultimate cause of climate change - increased greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere - adaptation strategies must acknowledge the abilities of
species, ecosystems, and socio-ecological systems to respond to continuous alterations in
baseline conditions." Craig 2, supra note 16, at 15.
108 See generally R. Craig I, supra note 13, at II.C. (discussing the need for resilience and adaptive
capacity as a "new paradigm for environmental and natural resources law in an age of climate
change adaptation").
'0' See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-
Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2008) (stating that "[e]ven as we learn more about the
highly coupled, tightly interacting processes that comprise the climate, the likelihood is that we
will realize with even greater clarity that it is inherently unpredictable").
"0 P. C. D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573
(2008) (arguing that the paradigm of stationarity - "that natural systems fluctuate within an
unchanging envelope of variability" - is no longer valid and that a new, dynamic, probabilistic
approach to managing natural resources is required in order to account for the dynamism of the
natural system).
See H. HOLGER ROGNER ET AL., Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION.
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tremendous need for an approach that emphasizes flexibility and
adaptability and that enhances the adaptive capacity of both humanity
and the natural world in response to the ongoing and forthcoming
challenges of climate change. 
1 2
As a first line of consideration, Section A below examines the
two contemporary cornerstone principles of international water law,
equitable and reasonable utilization and no significant harm, and their
applicability to water-related consequences of climate change. Section A
concludes that, while important for managing transboundary water
resources, the two principles offer little value for developing the type of
response needed to confront the challenges of climate change. Rather, in
order to meet and overcome the forthcoming challenges and their
impacts on global fresh water resources, the international community
must embrace fundamental adaptive reforms grounded in cooperation
and trust. Sections B, C, and D proffer some of the more important of
these reforms: a collaborative administration system, flexible
management, and a global approach. Ultimately, this article concludes
that governments and the international community will achieve an
appropriate and adequate response only by acknowledging the reality
that climate change is a global phenomenon that necessitates a collective
and coordinated effort.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 102 (B. Metz et al., eds., 2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications anddata/publicationsipcc_fourth-assessment-repoitwg3-
reportmitigation of_climatechange.htm. "Irreversibility is an important aspect of the climate
change issue, with implications for mitigation and adaptation responses. The response of the
climate system to anthropogenic forcing is likely to be irreversible over human time scales, and
much of the damage is likely to be irreversible even over longer time scales." Id.
112 According to the IPCC, "adaptive capacity" is described as: "the ability or potential of a system
to respond successfully to climate variability and change, and includes adjustments in both
behaviour and in resources and technologies." See Climate Change 2007: Impacts, supra note 19,
at 727. Craig asserts that:
[T]he new paradigm for environmental and natural resources law in an era of climate change
adaptation must be to increase the natural world's, human society's, socio-ecological systems',
and legal institutions' continuing capacity to adjust to continual transformation. In other words,
the overall goal of climate change adaptation law should be to increase humans', other species',
society's, and ecosystems' adaptive capacity.
Craig I, supra note 13, at lI.C.
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A. A REVIEW OF TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW
Customary international law applicable to transboundary water
resources offers a number of principles that are applicable to cross-
border water issues. Those include the cornerstone doctrines binding
states to an equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary surface
or ground water resources, and ensuring that their activities result in no
significant harm to other riparian states. While the first principle affords
all riparian states a correlative right to an equitable share of the benefits
of a river and mandates that all riparians use the river equitably and
reasonably, "3 the second limits a state's sovereign right to use its
territory only to the extent that it causes no significant harm to another
state. "4 Both principles are intended to prevent conflict and encourage
cooperation by providing a normative framework that prescribes how
states must act in relation to the use of transboundary waters within their
territories, as well as in relation to other riparian states.
Yet, despite the near-universal acceptance for the governance of
transboundary waters, the applicability and value of the principles of
equitable and reasonable utilization and of no significant harm are
limited in the context of climate change. Both principles focus entirely
on ensuring the rights of nations rather than on responding to climatic
variability; they aid in assessing liability and determining whether one
113 See Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229,
Art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter Watercourses Convention],
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf. See
generally STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: NON-
NAVIGATIONAL USES 384-405 (2nd ed. 2007) (defining the principle of equitable and reasonable
use). The principle is regarded as one of the bedrock principles of international water law. See,
e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra, at 404; Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J 7,
% 78, 85, 147, 150 (Sept. 25); Gabriel Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. International Law
Commission 's Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 537, 563 (2007) [hereinafter Eckstein 2007]; Law of Transboundary Aquifers, G.A.
Res. 63/124, art. 4 & 5, U.N. Doe. A/RES/63/124 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/478/23/PDFN0847823.pdf?OpenElement
[hereinafter Law of Transboundary Aquifers].
14 See McCaffrey, supra note 113, at 135 at 406-445; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,
22 (Apr. 9); see also Gretta Goldenman, Adapting to Climate Change: A Study of International
Rivers and Their Legal Arrangements, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 741, 779 (1990) (stating that the
principle of no harm is part of customary international law); Watercourses Convention, supra
note 113, at art. 7 (recognizing the principle of no significant harm as a fundamental and
substantive principle of international water law); Law of Transboundary Aquifers, supra note
113, at art. 6 (recognizing the principle as applying to transboundary ground water resources).
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state's actions have infringed on the rights of another. But the two
principles do not obligate states to manage their transboundary fresh
waters in a way that minimizes climate change consequences and
maximizes countries' abilities to respond effectively to this global
challenge.
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization is designed
to ensure that each riparian employs only reasonable uses of
transboundary waters and obtains an equitable share of the benefits of
shared waters. Any use that is unreasonable or that results in an
inequitable allocation of the benefits of a transboundary water body
constitutes a violation of other riparian states' rights. The no significant
harm principle precludes states from taking any action related to
transboundary waters that would cause significant harm to the rights and
interests of other riparian states.
Neither principle, though, is designed to bring countries together
collectively to face the challenges of climate change; neither one seeks to
allocate the benefits of and responsibilities for a transboundary fresh
water resource in relation to such a challenge. While states may seek to
comport their conduct to the principles, that conduct will only prevent
violations of the principles rather than truly ameliorate the consequences
of climate change.
Moreover, the value of the two principles is limited because the
principles are structured to apply ex post facto-after a project has been
implemented and after a violation is alleged-rather than ex ante-prior
to or during the implementation of a water-related project. Both
principles are generally interpreted as objective criteria, standards that
are intended to be assessed impartially and that are immune to agreed-
upon derogation. By that very nature, though, these principles become
exceptionally difficult to apply ex ante. The objective determination of
the equitable and reasonable uses of a transboundary watercourse or
whether or not a particular project may result in significant harm to
another state is, at best, an unworkable exercise. This is especially true
where the equity and reasonableness of a water use, as well as the
magnitude of the harm, are mere projections. The only possibility for
applying the principles objectively ex ante is through the use of an
impartial third party (e.g., in the context of negotiations over a
prospective water project), something that has never occurred.
To achieve true objectivity the principles would have to be
employed by an impartial arbiter after a violation is alleged. The
Vol. 27, No.3
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International Court of Justice did exactly that in the Gabjikovo-
Nagymaros case when it applied the principle of equitable and
reasonable utilization and concluded that Czechoslovakia, in unilaterally
diverting the Danube River and "assuming control of a shared
resource ... thereby depriv[ed] Hungary of its right to an equitable and
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube..."15
In the context of climate change, though, an ex post facto
assessment would defeat the very purpose of preventing and minimizing
the consequences of climate change. While we are certainly aware that
changes are occurring globally, regionally, and locally, we are only now
barely beginning to understand the scope, magnitude, and duration of the
consequences that will ensue. Only by employing proactive and flexible
measures in our approach to climate change will we be able to formulate
an adequate response to the looming challenges.
B. COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT
Climate change is a worldwide phenomenon that threatens
consequences on a regional and global scale. Individual state action,
whether mitigating or adaptive, is unlikely to achieve the scale of relief
necessary to diminish the consequences expected from this
unprecedented situation. Only a concerted, collaborative, and large-scale
effort based on cooperation" 6 and an objective of developing resilience
and adaptive capacity" 7 will produce the strategies and responses needed
to meet the oncoming challenge. Anything less is likely to result in
disjointed efforts that exacerbate scarcity and water stress regionally and
even globally.
A collaborative approach to the management of transboundary
waters, as it relates to a nation's shared fresh water resources, is directly
related to the geographic and hydrologic relationship that the nation
enjoys with its neighbors. It in no way internationalizes a country's fresh
water resources, but rather reflects the reality that interrelated water
resources can best be managed in an integrated and collaborative
'5 Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, 85.
116 Under international law, nations are obligated to cooperate in good faith and to collectively and
peaceful seek resolution to disputes and other transboundary challenges. See, e.g., Watercourses
Convention, supra note 113, at art. 8; Law of Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 113, art. 7.
Moreover, this principle serves as the foundation upon which to build a collaborative approach
that is both concerted and viable. See infra Part III.B.
117 See supra note 107-112 and accompanying text.
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fashion.'18 Hence, one of the fundamental collaborative reforms that
must be adopted by the international community is a basin approach to
the management of interrelated transboundary waters.
1. A BASIN APPROACH TO WATER MANAGEMENT
Scholars and international organizations have long recognized
the basin approach to the management of transboundary waters as the
"fulcrum of water resource development.""..9  The paradigm is endorsed
by such entities as the The World Bank,"'2 the European Union,'2 and the
U.N. International Law Commission (UNILC), 2' as well as numerous
non-governmental organizations. For example, the influential 1966
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,
formulated by the International Law Association (ILA), encouraged a
holistic, basin-wide approach to water management employing "a
geographical area extending over two or more States determined by the
"8 See generally Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman & 0lli Varis, Integrated Water Resources
Management: Evolution, Prospects and Future Challenges, SUSTAINABILITY: SC., PRACTICE, &
POLY, Spring 2005, at 15, http://ejournal.nbii.org/archives/vollissl/0407-03.rahaman.html;
Torkil Jonch-Clausen & Jens Fugl, Firming up the Conceptual Basis of Integrated Water
Resources Management, 17 WATER RESOURCES DEV. 501 (2001); Adil Al Radif, Integrated
Water Resources Management (IWRM): An Approach to Face the Challenges of the Next
Century and to Avert Future Crises, 124 DESALINATION 145 (1999).
"9 Ludwig A. Teclaff, Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and International Water
Law, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 359, 387 (1996) (describing the historical development of the basin
approach to transboundary water management).
20 THE WORLD BANK, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, 10-11 (1993) (discussing a need for a
comprehensive analysis at the river basin level), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/02/23/000178830_9810
1911251888/Rendered/PDF/multLpage.pdf.
121 See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/EC/60, 2000 O.J. (L 327/I) (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:327:0001:0072:EN:PDF (defining the
geographic unit of management as the river basin, and defining the river basin in Article 2(13) as
"the area of land from which all surface run-off flows through a sequence of streams, rivers and,
possibly, lakes into the sea at a single river mouth, estuary or delta"); see also DG
ENVIRONMENT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WATER NOTE I - JOINING FORCES FOR EUROPE'S
SHARED WATERS (March 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-
framework/pdf/water-notel-joining-forces.pdf (noting that "[t]he directive establishes an
innovative approach for water management based on river basins, the natural geographical and
hydrological units").
122 See Gabriel Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the Status of Ground Water Resources
Under the UN Watercourses Convention, 30 COLUMBIA. J. ENVT'L L. 525, 530-538 (2005)
[hereinafter Eckstein 2005] (describing the evolution of debates in the UNILC's development of
the jurisdictional scope of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, which settled on the basin-like
"watercourse" as the geographic unit for managing transboundary fresh water resources).
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watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and
underground waters, flowing into a common terminus.""'
Despite such broad support, states have not universally embraced
the approach. For example, in the early work of the UNILC that
eventually led to the development of the 1997 U.N. Convention on the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourses
Convention),'24 numerous countries objected to the drainage-basin
concept as the geographic unit for managing transboundary waters on the
grounds that it could be interpreted as an infringement of a nation's
sovereignty.'25  The geographic scope eventually adopted in the
Watercourses Convention was the "watercourse," which was defined as
"a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue of
their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a
common terminus."' 26  While conceptually very similar to the basin
approach, the Convention has yet to enter into force, suggesting a
possible lack of support for the propositions and principles contained in
the treaty, including the watercourse perspective.
The reluctance of some states notwithstanding, the basin
approach to managing shared fresh water resources is possibly the most
critical aspect of transboundary water management. It is grounded in the
doctrine of hydrological unity, which recognizes the interrelationship of
all hydraulically linked surface and ground waters within the hydrologic
cycle.'27 Moreover, it acknowledges that the "most effective way to use,
regulate, manage, and conserve shared water resources is through a
comprehensive scheme that takes into account all interrelated water
123 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT
HELSINKI, art. 11 (1967) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
124 Watercourses Convention, supra note 113.
125 Asit K. Biswas, Management of International Waters: Opportunities and Constraints, 15
WATER RESOURCES DEV. 429, 438 (1999); see also Eckstein 2005, supra note 116, at 531-32 &
534-535 (describing the opposition to the basin approach that was founded, in part, in the
classical conflict between upstream and downstream states).
126 Watercourses Convention, supra note 113 at art. 2(a).
127 See Yoram Eckstein and Gabriel Eckstein, Groundwater Resources and International Law in the
Middle East Peace Process, 28 WATER INT'L 154, 159-60 (2003) [hereinafter Eckstein &
Eckstein 2003b) (discussing the doctrine of hydraulic unity]; see also THE WORLD BANK, supra
note 120, at 40 (noting that "[i]nvestments, policies, and regulations in one part of a river basin
or in one sector affect activities throughout the basin"). The doctrine of hydraulic unity is related
to the concept of conjunctive use, which concerns the combined use of surface and ground water
to optimize resource use and minimize adverse effects of using a single source. See C.W.
FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 538-40 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing conjunctive use of surface
and ground water).
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resources."'' 28  As the UNILC noted, "[b]ecause the surface and
groundwaters form a system, and constitute by virtue of their physical
relationship a unitary whole, human intervention at one point in the
system may have effects elsewhere within it.'
' 29
The Aral Sea tragedy is but one of many examples in which
independent human activity in one region of the basin had disastrous
consequences in another part of the basin. 3 ° In that debacle, under the
guidance of the Soviet Union, some of the nations of the sister rivers of
the Amu Darya and Syr Darya diverted their waters for agricultural
purposes beginning in the middle of the last century.' 3 ' By the 1980s,
inflows from the two rivers into the Aral Sea fell by as much as 85%, and
in some years, no water passed through the lower reaches of the Amu
and Syr Darya rivers.'32 As a result, the Aral Sea-a terminal, inland
lake, which relies on the two rivers for its entire inflow-nearly dried out
entirely. By the early part of this century, the Aral Sea had lost one-half
of its surface area and 75% of its volume causing the lake to split into
two lake segments.'33  While recent reforms have witnessed the
128 Eckstein & Eckstein 2003b, supra note 127, at 159.
129 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, [1994] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 90, 4, U.N. Doc A/49/1 0.
130 The Aral Sea is a salt-water lake situated along the borders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and
was once the world's fourth largest inland body of water. I THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, MICROPEDIA 514 (15th ed 2005).
131 See Max Spoor, The Aral Sea Basin Crisis: Transition and Environment in Former Soviet
Central Asia, 29 DEV. AND CHANGE 409, 410 (1998) (noting the significance of agriculture in
decisions to divert and continue diverting the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers).
132 See id. at 418 (discussing the drop of inflow from the two Darya rivers into the Aral Sea from
45-55 km 3 annually in 1960, an average of 7 km3 by the early 1980s).
133 See Ilan Greenberg, A Vanished Sea Reclaims its Form in Central Asia; Aral Dam Project
Surpasses Expectations, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 6, 2006, at 2; Ragab & Prudhomme, supra
note 91, at 24. Another byproduct of the depletion of the Aral Sea is the release of salts stored in
the bed of the lake that were exposed as the waters receded. As the waters vanished, the salts,
which are now laced with herbicides, pesticides, and other chemicals from modem agricultural
practices, became exposed to the elements and were blown throughout Central Asia poisoning
the land. See Tom Bissell, Eternal Winter: Lessons of the Aral Sea Disaster, HARPER'S MAG.,
Apr. 1, 2002, at 41; Spoor, supra note 131, at 410. By 2001, the United Nations had estimated
that salinization of soils had damaged 46 percent of Uzbekistan's irrigated lands. Sabrina
Tavemise & David L. Stem, Old Farming Habits Leave Uzbekistan a Legacy of Salt, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2008, at A6. As a result of the depleted lake and salt damage, the region's
fishing industry collapsed, disease rates soared, the land became untenable, summer temperatures
spiked (due to the loss of heat absorption that the Sea previously provided), and of the 178
animal species that had historically been found in the Aral Sea region, only 38 survive today.
Bissell, supra note Bissell, at 41; Martin Fletcher, The Return of the Sea, TIMES (LONDON), June
23, 2007, at 48.
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revitalization of the northern lake,'34 the larger southern section continues
to wither due to the unsustainable and destructive activities of the
upstream states. 35
By following a holistic, basin approach to the management of a
transboundary watercourse, countries of each basin will be better able to
respond to the challenges of climate change and avoid similar ecological
disasters. They will be able to formulate and coordinate both short-term
and long-term strategies, as well as develop local, national, and basin-
level priorities for managing the shared waters. They will also be able to
develop plans for alternative scenarios that best prepare them for the
possible consequences of climate change. Ultimately, basin countries
will not only gain the ability to pool their resources to maximize the
benefits of the shared waters, they will also gain the ability to
collectively shoulder the expected burdens of climate change.
Certainly, such an approach could be construed as an affront to
sovereignty, especially where one or more nations is expected to bear a
larger share of the costs, or where greater benefits might accrue to some
but not to all nations in the basin. Notwithstanding the slight to
nationhood, such will be the price for minimizing the consequences of
climate change that any one country suffers and for maximizing the
benefits that each country derives from the watercourse.'36
In regions expecting prolonged and substantial droughts, such as
those in the sub-tropics and mid-latitudes, basin states should work
together to expand opportunities for capturing what little rainfall does
arrive. Such cooperation could include programs and technologies for
harvesting rainwater as well as for diverting and managing runoff."'
Basin states should also collectively explore means for producing new
water, such as through desalination technologies,'38 as well as enhancing
storage potential by constructing new and expanding existing
134 Greenberg, supra note 133, at 2; Fletcher, supra note 133, at 48.
135 See Fletcher, supra note 133, at 48; Tavernise & Stem, supra note 133.
136 Cf Vivekanandan and Nair, supra note 18, at 10 (discussing the need to develop burden- and
benefit-sharing mechanisms).
137 See generally Troy Payne & Janet Neuman, Remembering Rain, 37 ENVTL. L. 105 (2007).
138 See Ragab & Prudhomme, supra note 91, at 31 (suggesting various "innovative solutions" for the
expected problems associated with climate change, including desalination techniques).
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reservoirs,' 39 developing aquifer storage and recovery opportunities,'
and exploring other possibilities.
In contrast, countries that share basins that are likely to see an
increase in precipitation, such as those in the tropical regions and higher
latitudes, could band together to manage the expected flood waters
through diversion schemes, protection and enhancement of wetlands
designed to absorb naturally large volumes of water, and staggered dams
to minimize the destructive effects of massive deluges. Of course,
scientists expect regions, such as the Mekong and the Vistula river
basins, to endure the extremes of both floods and dry spells depending on
the season."' It is imperative for countries in these parts of the world,
particularly those that are less developed and have fewer resources, to
work along with their basin neighbors toward collective action.
2. JOINT INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
Institutional mechanisms have been installed in numerous
transboundary river basins around the world for the purpose of managing
and allocating shared waters, coordinating development and conservation
activities, and protecting aquatic environments for human and
environmental health. 42  Yet, in comparison with the number of
139 See IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 12 (contending that many states may find it
beneficial to increase storage behind dams because of the expected increase in the variability of
temporal runoff resulting from climate change).
140 Aquifer storage and recovery refers to the use of existing aquifers to store large quantities of
water for use when other sources are unavailable. This storage technique, in many cases, is more
preferable to water storage in surface reservoirs as dams and reservoirs, the traditional means for
water storage, tend to have high rates of evaporation, sediment accumulation, environmental
consequences, and other costs. Additionally, the decreasing availability of suitable sites for dam
projects, coupled with the enormous constructions costs and the limited lifespan, indicate that
subsurface storage of fresh water may be a preferable solution in many parts of the world,
especially those that are water-scarce and drought-plagued. See Herman Bouwer, Integrated
Water Management: Emerging Issues and Challenges 45 AGRIC WATER MGMT 217, 220 (2000)
(discussing the costs and benefits associated with surface and underground storage of water). See
generally S.R. Barnett et al., Aquifer Storage and Recharge: Innovation in Water Resources
Management, 47 AUSTL J. OF EARTH SCI. 13 (2000) (describing successful use of aquifer storage
and recovery for stormwater and treated sewerage effluent, previously regarded as waste).
141 See supra note 31-32 and accompanying text.
142 See generally Stephen Schwebel, Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/348, reprinted in 2(1) Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 175-
180 (1982), A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (discussing the widespread use and support for
"permanent institutional machinery" for the management of transboundary watercourses) and
Stephan C. McCaffrey, Sixth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/427 (1990), reprinted in [1990] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 41-
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transboundary surface and ground water resources found on the planet,
coordinated management of shared waters is still an uncommon
occurrence. 43  The result has been significant inefficiencies in the
management and conservation of shared waters, as well as occasional
conflicts, which, in turn, has detrimentally impacted economic
development, the environment, human health, and international
relations.'44
a. Benefits of Joint Institutional Mechanisms
Although there is no ideal model for managing an international
watercourse, lake, or aquifer, the development of a joint institutional
mechanism can provide unique benefits and opportunities for enhancing
the ability of basin riparians to respond to climate variability. Most
directly, the ability of riparian states to collectively shoulder the financial
and resource burdens of research, preventative measures, emergency
response, and development projects clearly supports the
institutionalization of a collaborative approach to the management of
shared water resources. Such a mechanism could also benefit
participating states by creating an institution with the dexterity and
capacity to respond to the needs of the basin in meeting the challenges
52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990/Add.I (Part 1) [hereinafter McCaffrey's Sixth Report]
(supplementing Schwebel's Third Report).
143 Of the world's 263 international watercourses, 60% (158 transboundary river basins) have no
cooperative management framework. Moreover, of the 105 international basins that employ
some type of water management institutions, less than 20% of those basins with more than three
riparians have multilateral agreements involving all of the riparians. See UN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMME, ATLAS OF INTERNATIONAL FRESHWATER AGREEMENTS 7 (2002); see also
McCaffrey's Sixth Report, supra note 142, at 43, 5 (referring to a 1979 list, compiled by the
Secretariat of the United Nations, that identified 90 bipartite and multipartite commissions
concerned with the non-navigational uses of international watercourses). And of the 273 known
transboundary aquifers worldwide, only one has such a framework - the Genevese Aquifer, See
Convention relative a la protection, a l'utilisation, a la realimentation et au suivi de la Nappe




English.pdf (unofficial English translation) - while two others have a basic data sharing
agreements. See Eckstein & Eckstein 2003a, supra note 14, at 227 (explaining that the Genevese
Aquifer agreement between France and Switzerland is the only international agreement that
directly addresses a transboundary aquifer).
'44 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 120, at 38 (stating that "coordinated management of
international river basins is still rare, resulting in economic losses, environmental degradation,
and international conflict").
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posed by climate change. By coordinating and collaborating together via
a single entity, the parties will be able to generate more data and
information, enhance their collective expertise in basin characteristics
and management, and develop a cadre of managers and experts who have
a unique knowledge of the particular basin. In so doing, they will also
enhance their ability to respond to changing climatic conditions, such as
extreme droughts and flood events, and to meet the needs of the
region. "'
b. Structure of Joint Institutional Mechanisms
The mere creation of a joint institutional mechanism is unlikely
to result in all of the benefits and promises of such a system. The
success of such entities will be greatly dependent on three chief factors:
(1) the extent and scope of authority assigned to the institution; (2) the
degree of flexibility afforded the institution in its operation, planning,
and project implementation; and (3) the financial and other support
provided to the institution by the riparian governments.
1) Authority
Nations are typically reluctant to undermine their sovereignty by
delegating decision-making authority to a supranational entity.146 This is
particularly evident in the absolutist position that most countries have
adopted with regard to natural resources located within their territory.
For example, the United Nations General Assembly resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources asserts that every nation
enjoys complete sovereignty over all natural resources found within its
jurisdiction. 47 The thought that a nation would be willing to relinquish
some aspect of that dominion is absurd to many national governments.
145 See Frank G.W. Jaspers, Institutional Arrangements for Integrated River Basin Management, 5
WATER POL'Y 77, 81-83 (2003) (discussing several justifications for integrating transboundary
river basin management); see also generally Claudia Sadoff & David Grey, Beyond the River:
the Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers, 4 WATER POL'Y 389 (2002) (describing and
analyzing the benefits derived from cooperation over international rivers).
146 Nations are especially reluctant to relinquish or diminish their right to fresh water resources
within their jurisdiction because "[I]ivelihoods and life itself depend on the volume and quality
of available water, making water scarcity and water securities a concern of every country."
Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 2.
147 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962). Pertinent paragraphs of the Declaration provide:
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Notwithstanding this traditional view of countries' natural
resources, there is a growing consensus among nations that
transboundary water resources should no longer be determined by
notions of sovereignty, but rather "by a positive spirit of cooperation and
effective interdependence."' 4t Moreover, there is much to be said about
the nature of water that characterizes the substance as different from
other natural resources and that diminishes the right of States to take an
absolutist position.'49 This is most evident in the universal rejection of
the international water law principles of absolute territorial sovereignty 5°
and absolute territorial integrity, 5' both of which have long been
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of
the people of the State concerned.
5. The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural
resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality.
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders
the development of international co-operation and the maintenance of peace. Id.
4 Green Cross International, National Sovereignty and International Watercourses 18 (2000),
available at
http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pcp/cd/pdf/background-documents/national-sovereign
ty%20_international watercourses_2000.pdf; Salman M.A. Salman, The United Nations
Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult? 32
WATER INT'L, 1, 12 (2007).
149 See generally Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, I WATER POL'Y 5, 487 (1999) (arguing
that access to water resources is a natural human right), available at
http://www.waterlaw.org/bibliography/articles/general/Gleick-Human Rt Water-1999.pdf; U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Committee on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 2, U.N. Doe. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (interpreting the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to include a human right to water that
"entitles everyone to sufficient, affordable, physically accessible, safe and acceptable water for
personal and domestic uses"). As a human right, the obligation to provide water would be rather
incompatible with profit-based operations that are typically employed in the extraction of other
natural resources. See Eckstein & Eckstein 2003a, supra note 14 at 251-256 (comparing rights to
water in non-recharging aquifers with rights to other fluidic natural resource like oil and gas).
'50 See McCaffrey, supra note 113, at 125 (asserting that the principle of absolute territorial
sovereignty has been rejected by nations and scholars in international water law and politics).
The principle of absolute territorial sovereignty posits that states have the fight to unrestrained
use of fresh water resources found within their territory, regardless of the transboundary
consequences of such use. See id. at 113-14 (describing the principle in the context of the
Harmon Doctrine).
's' See id. at 133 (noting that the principle of absolute territorial integrity has been abandoned by
scholars and the international community). The principle of absolute territorial integrity suggests
that lower riparian states have the right to the undiminished and continuous flow of a river flow-
ing into their territory from upper riparian states. See id. at 126.
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abandoned by scholars and nations.'52 In their stead emerged the
doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty'53 and the notion that
transboundary fresh water resources must be used equitably and
reasonably in relation to other riparians.'54 Arguably, these limitations
on sovereignty are rooted in the unique, life-giving quality of water that
make cooperation over its management so singularly important. Water,
after all, is fundamental to life.
Hence, while there certainly may be appropriate limitations on
the extent to which riparian nations might empower a joint supranational
institution, the ability of the institution to carry out its mandate
successfully will greatly depend on the degree of authority it receives."'
At the very least, such authority should include jurisdiction over the
entire hydrographic basin-all hydraulically-related fresh water
resources in the basin' 56 -and encompass the mandate to engage all basin
riparians in ongoing dialogue, produce and exchange relevant data and
information, ' and coordinate activities designed to prevent and mitigate
the impacts of climate change. Ideally, such authority would also
include the responsibility to assess and identify the most effective
's2 See id. at 125-26 and 133 (noting that these principles "deny that sovereignty entails duties as
well as rights").
See Id. at 135 (describing the principle of limited territorial sovereignty as "the prevailing
theory"). The principle of limited territorial sovereignty posits that a state's sovereignty is
limited by its obligation not to use its territory in a way that causes significant harm to other
states. This doctrine has been more fully articulated in the form of the principle of no significant
harm. See supra Part lII.A.
154 See McCaffrey, supra note 113, at 384-405; 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra note 113, at
art. 5. The principle of equitable and reasonable use entitles each riparian state to a reasonable
and equitable share in the beneficial uses of an international water resource. Essentially, the
principle is a utilitarian concept employing a cost-benefit analysis that attempts to maximize the
beneficial uses of limited water resources while minimizing the burdens. See Eckstein 2007,
supra note 113, at 563-564 (defining the principle in the context of transboundary ground water
resources).
'55 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 120, at 45 ("River basin organizations can be an effective
means for coordination when they have adequate authority and financial autonomy").
156 Itay Fischendler, Legal and Unstitutional Adaptation to Climate Uncertainty: A Study of
International Rivers, 6 WATER POL'Y 1, 3 (2004) (asserting that "Joint institutions will have
greater flexibility to mitigate crisis situations if they are given control over the different parts of
the hydrologic cycle, including allocation of surface water, groundwater and water quantity"); cf
E. Feitelson, The Upcoming Challenge: Transboundary Management of the Hydraulic Cycle,
123 WATER, AIR, AND SOIL POLLUTION 533, 547 (2000) (discussing the need for institutions at
all levels of government, including international, that would be empowered to address
increasingly complex transboundary water issues).
157 See infra note 161-163 (discussing the obligation to exchange data and information) and 164-166
(discussing the obligation to monitor).
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preventative and mitigatory measures and to craft the appropriate steps
that each basin state must take to implement such measures.
Although the International Boundary and Water Commission
(IBWC) operating on the Mexico-United States border does not have an
explicit mandate to address climate change issues, it is an example of a
supranational institution that enjoys an advanced level of authority and
that has considerable success in pursuing its responsibilities. Composed
of both a Mexican and an American section, the IBWC exercises its
collaborative mandate and commitments through decisions called
Minutes.'58 These Minutes are transmitted to the respective governments
and, if neither denied by either nation within 30 days nor requiring an
affirmative approval, become binding commitments.'59 Among other
things, the IBWC has been entrusted with the following duties:
investigating, planning, constructing, operating, and maintaining joint
water projects, such as stream-gauging stations, storage dams and
reservoirs, and hydroelectric power plants; protecting land along the Rio
Grande from floods with levees and floodway projects; and settling
disputes between the states over the interpretation or application of the
treaty authorizing the IBWC. 6o
Another noteworthy basin commission with considerable
authority and a history of success is the Organization for the
Development of the Senegal River, known by its French acronym as
OMVS.'' In addition to having full legal personality, the OMVS has
supranational character that allows it to plan, construct, operate, and
maintain jointly-owned water projects even if located fully within one of
the member states. It also has authority to develop strategy for the entire
basin, and to reallocate periodically the river's water based on changes in
158 See Treaty relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the
Rio Grande, art. 7, U.S.-Mex., February 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter Rio Grande Treaty].
'59 See id. at art. 25; see also Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into
Institutional Responsiveness and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 397, 398 (1993).
'60 See Rio Grande Treaty, supra note 158, at arts. 2, 5-9, 12, 13, 23, 25; see also U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Institutions for International Freshwater
Management, Technical Documents in Hydrology No. 3, 33-34 (2003) (prepared by S. Burchi
and M. Spreij) [hereinafter Burchi & Sprechi].
161 OMVS is the acronym for Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve S~n~gal. The OMVS
is composed of the West African nations of Guinea, Mail, Mauritania, and Senegal. The Senegal
River originated in Guinea, flows northward through Mail, and then forms the border between
Mauritania and Senegal as it makes it way west toward the Atlantic Ocean.
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flow and availability of water in the river as well as the changing needs
of the member states.1
62
2) Flexibility and Agility
To meet the challenges of climate change and to function
efficiently, joint water management organizations require a flexible
mandate that allows them to adapt their operations, planning, and
implementation activities to changing conditions. As noted by the IPCC,
while scientists are confident that global climatic changes will affect
water resources worldwide, they are unable to provide precise
predictions at the regional and local scales.'63 For example, some climate
change models suggest that certain transboundary watercourses, such as
the Rhine, Congo, and Indus river basins, should expect an increase in
both precipitation and temperature. While the former is likely to result in
more flood events, the latter could intensify evapotranspiration resulting
in an increase in the frequency of droughts."6
The resulting uncertainty in predicting whether the basin should
expect floods, droughts, or other climatic impacts in any given season
creates considerable planning complications for the basin states and,
especially, for joint water management organizations. As a result, joint
institutional mechanisms must not be hampered with procedures and
obligations that would constrain their ability to quickly and adeptly
respond to dynamic climatic changes. Moreover, they must escape the
paradigm of stationarity and develop alternative probabilistic approaches
that can better respond to the variability of climate change and ensure
that any negative impacts are minimized and managed.'65  Such
approaches can incorporate flexible management systems that allow the
162 See U.N., WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1: WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE,
Pilot Case Studies: A Focus on Real- World Examples, Senegal River Basin - Guinea, Mali,
Mauritania, Senegal 447, 458 (2003); Burchi and Spreij, supra note 160, at 14-17.
113 IPCC Technical Paper, supra note 1, at 167 (stating that "[pirojections of future precipitation,
soil moisture and runoff at regional scales are subject to substantial uncertainty").
'64 See Yukiko Hirabayashi et al., Global Projections of Changing Risks of Floods and Droughts in
a Changing Climate, 53 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 754, 769 (2008).
65 "[S]tationarity is dead and should no longer serve as a central, default assumption in water-
resource risk assessment and planning." Milly, supra note 110, at 573 (suggesting that the
paradigm of stationarity - "the idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope
of variability - is no longer valid, especially in light of "the magnitude and ubiquity of the
hydroclimatic change apparently now under way" and recommends a dynamic, probabilistic
approach for managing and optimizing water systems).
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institutions to adapt their mechanisms, activities, and policies in response
to changes on the ground. This type of adaptive management style is
discussed further below.'66
3) Financial and Other Support
An especially noteworthy aspect of a joint institutional
mechanism that requires attention pertains to the financial and related
support provided to the institution. Regardless of the authority granted to
an institution, the absence of financial and other mechanisms to support
and sustain the institution's activities can render the institution
ineffective and irrelevant. Hence, to ensure that a joint water
management mechanism can produce the expected benefits and
promises, it must have the appropriate resources to carry out its mandate.
This includes both financial and human resources as well as the political
capital necessary to carry out policies and implement projects that may
be unpopular but necessary. Accordingly, governmental support by all
of the basin riparians must be secured and assured in order to allow the
institution to formulate and implement effectively its responsibilities.
3. EXCHANGE OF DATA AND INFORMATION
The obligation to exchange data and information on a regular
basis is critical to the sound management of transboundary waters.'67
Absent such an exchange, it becomes impossible for basin states or basin
institutions to manage water uses, formulate basin-wide policies, or take
measures to minimize floods, droughts, and pollution. That imperative
has been codified in numerous international instruments concerning
transboundary fresh water resources and has been recognized in various
international fora. 16 ' This imperative is also well recognized in the
166 See infra note 179-187, and accompanying text.
167 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 120, at 43 (asserting that "inadequate and unreliable data
constitute a serious constraint to developing and implementing a country's water resource
strategy and to managing water effectively"); Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 12.
168 For a extensive list of agreements incorporating the principle, see Stephen McCaffrey, Fourth
Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 205, 210 n.28 (1988) [hereinafter McCaffrey's Fourth Report]. See also See also
Ludwik A. Teclaff& Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Groundwater Pollution: Survey and Trends
in Treaty Law, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 77, 110 (Teclaff & Utton eds., 1981)
(asserting that "[tIhere is no longer any question that modem treaty practice incorporates the duty
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climate change context because of its variable nature and the
considerable gaps that remain in knowledge, especially on the local and
regional levels.169
While the type of data and information that must be exchanged is
most often left to the negotiations of basin riparians, in the context of
climate change and transboundary watercourses, relevant information
includes scientific and technical data related to climatic conditions in the
basin, the watercourse itself, and the surrounding basin environment.17 °
Additionally, such data and information also includes knowledge of the
populations and ecosystems that depend on the watercourse, current and
planned water uses, and management activities including regulatory
actions and conservation measures.' 7
A corollary to the obligation to regularly exchange data and
information is the duty to monitor changing conditions related to
transboundary waters.'72  In order to have the necessary data and
information, such data and information must be generated in a consistent
manner so as to provide a clear picture of the nature of the watercourse,
especially in the context of climate change. Moreover, because climate
change is a dynamic and long-term phenomenon, it is necessary to
continuously develop and collect the data and information so that the
ongoing climatic consequences on the watercourse are recorded and
to exchange information" in the context of transboundary water agreements); Law of
Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 113, at art. 8.
169 See generally UNECE Guidance on Water and Climate Change, supra note 60, at 47-55
(discussing the need for information and monitoring in the climate change context).
170 See UNECE Guidance on Water and Climate Change, supra note 60, at 52 (describing the
climate change-related information needed to include meteorological data, hydrological data,
morphological data, water quality data, and statistics related to these elements).
7! Article 9(1) of the 1997 Watercourses Convention provides that "watercourse States shall on a
regular basis exchange readily available data and information on the condition of the
watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological
nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts." Watercourses Convention,
supra note 113, at art. 9(1). Article 8(1) of the General Assembly Resolution on the law of
Transboundary Aquifers states that "aquifer States shall, on a regular basis, exchange readily
available data and information on the condition of their transboundary aquifers or Aquifer
systems, in particular of a geological, hydrogeological, hydrological, meteorological and
ecological nature and related to the hydrochemistry of the aquifers or aquifer systems, as well as
related forecasts." Law of Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 113, at art. 8(1). See UNECE
Guidance on Water and Climate Change, supra note 60, at 52.
172 See Stephen Stec & Gabriel E. Eckstein, Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: The Environmental
Impact of the ICJ's Decision in the Case Concerning the Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project, 8 Y.B.
OF INT'L ENVT'L L. 41, 48 (1997); see also, Law of Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 113, at
art. 13.
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examined. 73  Accordingly, basin states must be engaged in the
continuous development, collection, and exchange of the relevant
characteristics and conditions related to the transboundary
watercourse. '74
A chief concern for the management of a transboundary basin is
that all basin States harmonize the methodologies, techniques,
procedures, assumptions, and technologies-collectively known as
metadata 75-used in the generation and processing of data and
information. This concern is based on the reality that there can be more
than one approach or instrumentation available to assess a particular
basin characteristic, such as river flow rates, chemical composition,
extent of hydraulic connection between surface and ground waters, and
dependent populations and ecosystems.' 76 At times, the metadata can
produce disparate results because of the multitude of factors and
assumptions that go into the process of assessing the characteristic.
Moreover, due to differences in education, training, experience, and
preferences, the professionals employed by states producing data for a
transboundary watercourse will often use different methodologies and
procedures and focus on different characteristics of the basin. As a
result, the data and information produced may be incompatible and, at
173 See Craig 1, supra note 13, at 30-31 (advocating for a principle of "Monitor[ing] and Study[ing]
Everything" related to climate change).
174 Former Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, Judge Weeramantry, proposed that
the duty to monitor is better styled as a principle of continuing environmental impact assessment
that can only be accomplished through the regular exchange of data and information. See
Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 88 (Sept. 25) (Separate Opinion of
Vice-President Weeramantry).
'75 The United States Geological Survey (USGS) describes metadata as consisting "of information
that characterizes data. Metadata are used to provide documentation for data products. In
essence, metadata answer who, what, when, where, why, and how about every facet of the data
that are being documented." United States Geological Survey,
http://geology.usgs.gov/tools/metadata/tools/doc/faq.html#ql.l (emphasis in original) (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009). This description relies on the definition and standard proffered for
metadata by the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC), an interagency committee that
promotes the coordinated development, use, sharing, and dissemination of geospatial data on a
national basis. FGDC defines metadata as ". . .a file of information. . . which captures the basic
characteristics of a data or information resource. It represents the who, what, when, where, why
and how of the resource." Federal Geographic Data Committee, http://www.fgdc.gov/metadata
(last visited 2/12/09).
176 See Eckstein 2007, supra note 113, at 581. See also Gabriel Eckstein, Protecting A Hidden
Treasure: The U.N. International Law Commission and the International Law of Transboundary
Ground Water Resources, 5 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 5, 10 (2005) (discussing the
problems of exchanging data and information that is incompatible or otherwise unusable by other
aquifer States).
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worst, may be useless for establishing cross-border, baseline
characteristics in the basin and for the ongoing monitoring and assessing
of subsequent changes. 1
77
Accordingly, the harmonization of metadata among basin
riparians is an imperative that must be addressed early in any
collaborative effort related to climate change.' Although such
technicalities may seem trivial for politicians and decision-makers, the
lack of synchronized methodologies, techniques, procedures,
assumptions, and technologies can undermine the collaborative approach
sought and needed for responding to the threat of climate change.
Moreover, an agreement on harmonization can serve as a basis upon
which to build stronger basin relationships and further collaborative
climate change action.
C. FLEXIBILITY IN MANAGEMENT
While there is near-universal consensus that climate change will
affect global water resources, in many cases significantly, modem
science is still unable to identify precise consequences at specific
locations. As a result, effective legal and policy responses to climatic
impacts-both mitigation and adaptation-are difficult at best and often
based on educated guesses.'79 Accordingly, to meet the challenges posed
by climate change, nations must embrace a new paradigm of flexibility in
management, one that allows mechanisms, plans, and policies to adapt in
response to changes on the ground. 8' Moreover, they need to formulate
177 See Eckstein 2007, supra note 113, at 578 and 582-83 (discussing the problems of exchanging
data and information, in the context of transboundary aquifers, that is incompatible or otherwise
unusable by other aquifer States); UNECE Guidance on Water and Climate Change, supra note
60, at 65 (explaining that "[t]he use of different scenarios and GCMs by neighbouring countries
could lead to differences in climate and impact projections, possibly leading to contradictory
adaptation measures").
17 Cf UNECE Guidance on Water and Climate Change, supra note 60, at 54 and 65 (discussing the
need to coordinate and harmonize the generation of data).
179 Joseph Arvai et al., Adaptive Management of the Global Climate Problem: Bridging the Gap
Between Climate Research and Climate Policy, 78 CLIMATIC CHANGE 217, 217 (2006).
"o See UNECE Guidance, supra note 13, at 6. One of the main messages of the UNECE Guidance
document is that:
"Adaptation needs to be flexible. This is required by the uncertainties which exist about the
direction and nature of change the climate is causing in hydrological systems. Interventions
chosen should be flexible enough to deliver maximum benefits under a range of conditions
instead of being designed for what are thought to be the 'most likely' future conditions. If
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approaches that explicitly consider a dynamic and unpredictable
environment. 8'
1. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
To achieve the new paradigm of flexibility, basin states must
create an environment and a transboundary regulatory structure that
fosters the adoption and implementation of an adaptive management
approach to the administration of transboundary waters. Adaptive
management is a decision-making framework for governing water
resources that incorporates uncertainty into the planning process.'82 It is
a process of experimentation that, rather than testing hypotheses in a
stilted laboratory setting, implements its trials in the real world.'83
Fundamentally, adaptive management necessitates both feedback and
updated information, both of which are dependent on a monitoring and
review process. "4
conditions change again, or if the changes prove different from those expected today, the
measures taken should be capable of changing in step."
Id. See also International Conference on Freshwater, Bonn, F.R.G, Dec. 3-7 2001, Water-A Key
to Sustainable Development: Recommendation for Action 1, 7 available at
http://www.earthsummit2002.org/ic/freshwater/Bonn%2ORecommendations.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009) (stating that "Decision-making mechanisms under uncertainty should ensure
flexibility to respond to both rapid onset disasters and long-term changes to water resources").
181 See Milly, supra note 110, and accompanying text.
182 Carl Bruch, Adaptive Water Management: Strengthening Laws and Institutions to Cope with
Uncertainty in WATER MANAGEMENT IN 2020 AND BEYOND 91-92 (Asit K. Biswas, & Cecilia
Tortajada, eds. 2009); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management - Is It Possible?, 7 MINN.
J.L. Sci. & TECH. 21,28-30,38 (2005).
183 In other words, adaptive management entails a continuous iterative management process that
endeavors to learn through a process of trial and error and that adjusts its policies and actions in
response to changes in circumstances and new information. Bruch, supra note 182, at 91; Arvai,
supra note 179, at 218; UNECE Guidance, supra note 13, at 6.
84 See Vivekanandan & Nair, supra note 18, at 9 (discussion the need for "the continuous and
dynamic adjustment of management practices through monitoring and feedback mechanisms");
Ruhl, supra note 182, at 28-30, 38. Monitoring, in the context of assessing the implementation
and effectiveness of a law, would require the periodic examination of various indicators related
to the operationalization of the law, such as the process of implementing the law, the intended
and unintended effects of the law, the extent to which the law achieved the targeted goals, the
reasons why the law achieved or failed to achieve the targeted goals, the social, economic, and
other costs associated with the operationalization of the law, and others. Likewise, there would
be a need to continuously assess the underlying data upon which the law was established, which,
in the context of climate change, would entail monitoring changes in weather patterns,
precipitation levels, river flows, environmental impacts, and a host of other climate-related
factors. Thereafter, the results of the two monitoring regimes would be reviewed in relation to
the current law, and the law would be modified with the goal of improving its ability to achieve
its targeted goals. Bruch, supra note 182, at 99-100.
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In the context of legal frameworks, institutional mandates, or
management practices, adaptive management entails the acceptance and
incorporation of uncertainty into laws, regulations, policies, and action
plans through the institutionalization of the trial and error process.'85
This means that any legal framework applicable to a transboundary river
or aquifer must incorporate language and simple procedures allowing for
periodic changes to the objectives, rights, and obligations defined in the
instrument. This will allow the agreement to operate dynamically in
relation and in response to new information. Likewise, any institutional
mechanism authorized to operate on or manage a transboundary fresh
water resource must have the capacity and authority to quickly respond
to new data and information and to alter its activities, responsibilities,
and objectives.
Understandably, implementing adaptive management in a
transboundary context could prove difficult, not least because it would
require governments and policymakers to admit to and learn from
failures and mistakes in a very public process.'86 It also could face
obstacles where the costs associated with the implementation of an
experimental and adaptive approach to planning may be regarded as
overly burdensome in political and social contexts, as well as in
economic terms.'87 Moreover, implementation of adaptive management
may be frustrated by the lack of accommodating domestic and
transboundary legal regimes that allow flexibility in management
decisions. "'
Nonetheless, in light of the uncertainty of climate change,
adaptive management may be one of the few viable methodologies for
responding to the variability of climate change. Clearly, such an
approach requires a revised political perspective in which governments
and policymakers, as well as the citizenry, adopt a long-term time
horizon that emphasizes a process of learning and improving policies and
'85 A law, for example, would be construed as provisional to the extent that it is based on the best
available or most recent evidence. Since such evidence is never complete or devoid of
uncertainty, the law would be subject to periodic modification in response to an assessment of its
implementation and effectiveness, as well as to new information related to the underlying data
upon which it is founded. Bruch, supra note 182, at 93.
186 Certainly, such public exposure to scrutiny would make any elected or appointed official wish to
distance themselves from such management schemes. Arvai, supra note 179, at 218.
187 Arvai, supra note 179, at 220.
'88 Cf Craig 2, supra note 16, at 16 (discussing some of the obstacles to the implementation of
adaptive management in domestic US law).
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management, rather than one concerned with ideology and political
gain.'89 Additionally, there is a strong case to be made that over the
longer term, adaptive management will result in lower societal costs,
especially given that inaction could prove disastrous.' 90
2. NEEDS OVER RIGHTS
In order for a flexible approach to succeed, basin states must also
reassess their relationship to the basin and their neighbors, and pursue an
allocation and management strategy from a needs-based approach rather
than a rights-based perspective.' 9 ' In contrast to a rights-based approach,
which relies on the inherent right of each riparian state to obtain some
measure of the benefits of a transboundary watercourse,'92 a needs-based
approach begins the allocation analysis by assessing the minimum
requirements of each state based on established and agreed-upon
criteria. "'
181 See generally John Dembach, Navigating the U.S. Transition to Sustainability: Matching
National Governance Challenges with Appropriate Legal Tools, 44 TULSA L.J. 93 (2009).
190 See UNECE Guidance, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that "Adaptation may be costly, but it is
much more cost-effective to start it now, because costs will be much higher once the effects of
climate change are irreversible"); Arvai, supra note 179, at 221.
191 See Aaron T. Wolf, From Rights to Needs: Water Allocations in International treaties, in,
MANAGEMENT OF SHARED GROUNDWATER RESOURCES: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CASE WITH
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 133, 137-38 (E. Feitelson & M. Haddad eds., 2000)
(discussing a shift in which treaty negotiating is becoming more needs rather than rights-based);
see also Meena Palaniappan & Peter H. Gleick, Peak Water, in THE WORLD'S WATER: 2008-
2009, at 13 (Peter H. Gleick ed., 2009) (articulating the 'soft path' approach to water
management as moving toward a demand oriented management regime under which rather "than
seek endless sources of new supply, the soft path matches water services to the scale of the users'
needs, and it takes environmental and social concerns into account to ensure that basic human
needs and the need of the natural world are both met"); Oliver M Brandes, At a Watershed:
Ecological Governance and Sustainable Water Management in Canada, 16 J. ENV. L. & PRAC.
79, 83-84 (2005) (advocating ". ..for a shift from supply-oriented to demand-oriented water
management [that] emphasizes the need to manage people in the watershed and not the
watershed itself' and an approach that emphasizes health watersheds as a prerequisite to water
management rather than managing the watershed as an adjunct of the water supply).
192 The principles of absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity are extreme
examples of a rights approach to water management and allocation. See supra notes 150-51, and
accompanying text. Though the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization is a more
balanced methodology, it nonetheless is focused on the inherent rights of each state to some
measure of the benefits of a transboundary watercourse. See supra note 154.
193 See Wolf, supra note 191, at 137-38, 140-141 (describing various examples where minimum
requirements for specific needs were articulated for purposes of negotiating agreements,
including water for agricultural and irrigation needs, per capita consumption, and existing uses).
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The notion of "vital human needs" articulated in Article 10 of
the Watercourses Convention may be a valid point of departure.'94 It has
been interpreted as referring to "sufficient water to sustain human life,
including both drinking water and water required for production of food
in order to prevent starvation."'95 Any water or benefits remaining after
such needs are met can then be allocated based on an agreed-upon legal
mechanism or in accordance with a basin plan formulated to respond to
the possible consequences of climate change. Such an approach requires
that basin states quantify their present needs to the watercourse and, as
discussed above, exchange that information.'96 Of course, given that
populations grow and needs change over time, such assessment will
require periodic updates and the distribution of basin benefits may have
to be readjusted.
The chief benefit of such an approach lies in the paradigm's
emphasis on quantifying claims based on justified needs rather than on
legal rights, which often can exceed available water resources. A needs-
based approach to the allocation of a transboundary watercourse,
especially in regions of scarcity, like the Middle East, could lessen
unnecessary complications related to inchoate claims of right and
abstract principles of law and allow parties to negotiate from concrete,
fact-based positions. This, in turn, will allow the basin states to prioritize
allocations and uses of the basin's waters, and to manage the watercourse
based on agreed-upon schemes for addressing climate change conditions.
As in the basin approach to the management of transboundary
waters, this paradigm entails a relinquishment of sovereignty to the
extent that riparian states must forego, at least initially, their inherent
right to the equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse.'97 The same
sovereignty arguments, however, presented in the discussion on the basin
approach' and on the authority afforded to a joint water management
institution apply equally to the diminution of sovereignty resulting from
this paradigm shift."' Moreover, the benefits derived from such an
approach, particularly those related to the minimization of disputes and
94 Watercourses Convention, supra note 113, at Art. 10(2).
1'5 U.N. Gen. Assembly, 51st Sess., Sixth Comm., Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses: Report of the Sixth Committee Convening as the Working
Group of the Whole, 8, U.N. Doc. A/51/869 (Apr. 11, 1997).
196 See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
1'7 See supra notes 118-41 and accompanying text.
'g See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
'9 See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
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the flexibility ingrained in the planning system, are likely to far outweigh
any disadvantages related to sovereignty.
D. PRIORITIZING ADAPTATION
To date, much of the discussion surrounding climate change has
focused on mitigation, in some cases, to the exclusion of adaptation.
This is evident in the emphasis of both the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Bali Action
Plan on binding targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.20 While
mitigation is certainly a critical component of national and international
climate change policy, many of the expected consequences of climate
change are inevitable. This is especially evident in the context of global
fresh water resources. Accordingly, states and the international
community must expand their focus to include adaptive strategies as part
of the overall climate change approach.
1. INCORPORATING ADAPTATION INTO DEVELOPMENT
Development today is no longer the mere pursuit of economic
growth, social progress, knowledge, or simply a better life. With climate
change impacts augmenting existing nuisances and placing new obstacles
in the way of the human experience, development today necessarily
involves adapting to the new realities. The developmental question is no
longer limited to "what can be done to advance humanity," but rather
now encompasses "how can we maintain and ensure human lives under
changing environmental conditions." This is true in both the developed
and developing world, but is an especially harsh reality for peoples and
nations who lack the resources and abilities to formulate appropriate
adaptive strategies.
200 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] available at
http://unfccc.int/essential-background/kyotoprotoco/items/1678.php; U.N. Framework Conv.
on Climate Change, Conf. of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its
Thirteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.I (Mar. 14, 2008) (adopting Bali Action
Plan at 3) available at http://www.unisdr.org/eng/risk-reduction/climate-change/docs/Bali-
Action-plan.pdf.
456
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Accordingly, all nations must "do development differently. 20 1
This requires governments to incorporate strategies into all of their
development activities that facilitate adaptation to climatic variability
and climate change. °2 Fundamentally, this means using a climate
change lens through which they consider new proposals, projects, and
objectives. It also requires states and the international community to
adopt new policies, laws, and domestic funding mechanisms to facilitate
the integration of adaptation strategies into development campaigns,
investment plans, and the educational system. For example, drought and
water resource planning should be mandated in all regions expected to
succumb to growing water scarcity conditions as a result of climate
change. Moreover, such planning should be incorporated into all new
municipal, industrial, and agricultural improvement and expansion
projects in order to ensure that existing and projected new water
resources are adequate to meet the short and long-term needs of people
and the environment.
Understandably, many nations, especially those in the
developing world, lack the domestic capacity and resources to undertake
such a significant alteration to their development practices. Moreover,
many of these countries are most vulnerable to climatic variability and
changes due to their geography, topography, and lack of local fresh water
resources. As a result, they are susceptible to the so-called "snowball
effect" where the lack of capacity to alter their approach exacerbates
their vulnerability and worsens the consequences. Accordingly, an
international effort must be established to support those most vulnerable
to climate change, possibly under the auspices of a global climate change
support program (discussed below)," 3 which would allow them to
achieve the same objectives as those with the capacity to adapt.
201 See U.N. Development Programme, Adaptation to Climate Change - Integrating Adaptation Into
Development, http://www.undp.org/climatechange/adapt/mainstream.html (last visited 6/23/09)
(using the "do development differently" language).
202 This is the approach adopted by the members of the Organization for the Economic Co-operation
and Development nations in 2006. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev, [OECD], Dev.and
Envtl. Ministers of OECD Member Countries, Declaration on Integrating Climate Change
Adaptation into Development Co-operation (Apr. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/29/36426943.pdf; see also OECD, Members of the
Development Assistance Committee at the DAC High Level Meeting, Statement of Progress on
Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation (May 21, 2008),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/53/40909509.pdf.
203 See infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
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For example, new funding opportunities should be crafted, and
existing funding mechanisms should be modified, to incorporate adaptive
strategies into all development funding activities. This means
incorporating line-items and resources for climate change vulnerability
studies, adaptation strategizing, adaptation capacity building, and
adaptation implementation projects as components of financed
development activities. In appropriate cases, such components should be
made obligatory by the donor agencies and funding institutions as part of
the development strategy pursued by the recipient.
2. A GLOBAL APPROACH TO ADAPTATION
While climate change will impact different regions in disparate
ways, climate change is a global phenomenon that will likely have a
measurable impact in every corner of the planet. Many of the regions
and nations around the world, however, are already experiencing
considerable difficulty in responding to and planning for the expected
changes. One of the principal difficulties in formulating an adequate
response to climate change is a lack of adequate knowledge and
resources, factors that are inextricably intertwined. Numerous countries,
in both the developed and developing worlds, have a dearth of data and
information needed to make climate change-related planning decisions.
Many of these same countries cannot produce the necessary information;
they either lack the human capital or the resources necessary to carry out
the required studies, or both.
A global approach to climate change adaptation entails
international collaborative empowerment, which is the creation of
opportunities to allow all nations to be able to meet the present and
forthcoming challenges." 4 This approach includes the development of a
global climate change support program (GCCSP) to facilitate
information development and cooperation.
A GCCSP is critical to ensuring that all nations have the
opportunity to prepare adequately for the coming challenges. While such
a program would encompass all climate change-related data and
'04 Ostensibly, adaptation is already recognized as a component of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. Among others, Article 4(l)(d) of the Convention requires
parties to "cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.. ." United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M.
849, 1220 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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information needs, in the context of climate change-related water issues,
it would provide assistance to countries in need in three main ways.
First, it will facilitate the provision of data and information relevant to
each country and region. It could do this by compiling all of the
available studies and information for specific regions and countries and
disseminating it as needed.
Next, the GCCSP will seek and develop opportunities for
generating additional data to fill in gaps in knowledge. This could be
accomplished by facilitating collaborative efforts among researchers and
institutions within and outside the particular region or country. The
program also would secure and provide grants to support the production
of new information, either through such collaborative efforts or by
directly engaging experts to undertake needed studies.2"5
Finally, the GCCSP should engage basin states in discussions
and exchanges, facilitate cooperative efforts to undertake needed
research, and develop and coordinate plans designed to respond to the
challenges of climate change. The GCCSP will also encourage the
formalization of such cooperation through the development of bilateral
and multilateral agreements and institutional mechanisms, such as those
discussed above.2 °6
As an international endeavor, such a program will have to be
structured either within an existing intergovernmental organization or as
an independent entity. Existing organizations whose mandate may be
adaptable to undertake these additional responsibilities may include the
United Nations Environmental Program 207  or the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,05 with the support
from UN-Water. 29 As for an independent approach, given that models
25 Article 4(4) of the UNFCCC provides that "developed country Parties and other developed
Parties... shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects." Id. at
art. 4(4).
206 See supra notes 142-168, and accompanying text.
207 The United Nations Environmental Program already has a focus on climate change. See UNEP -
Climate Change at http://www.unep.org/climatechange/ (last visited June 22, 2009).
208 See United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization - Homepage,
http://www.unesco.org/ (last visited June 22, 2009).
20 UN-Water is an inter-agency mechanism that was created in 2003 by the United Nations High
Level Committee on Programmes. See UN-Water Website, http://www.unwater.org (last visited
Apr. 17, 2009). Its purpose is to "strengthen[] coordination and coherence among UN entities
dealing with issues related to all aspects of freshwater and sanitation." While the entity's focus is
on the UN system's various agencies, it may be well positioned to expand its mission to
encompass regional and national needs given its wealth of information, its experience in
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of effective international organizations are not lacking, there is no need
to describe the makeup of the organization. In either scenario, though,
the creation of a GCCSP will entail a secretariat responsible for
managing and implementing the three responsibilities. It will also
require the creation of a mechanism for securing funding from the
international community, potentially from both public and private
sources, which might be rolled into the existing Adaptation Fund
apparatus under the Kyoto Protocol,2"' or modeled on the Global
Environment Facility (GEF).2 '
Regardless of the structure of this global support system, it is
imperative that it be established sooner than later. In order to ensure that
all countries and all people have the tools and knowledge to prepare
adequately for the coming changes to fresh water resources, both locally
and globally, the entire global community must embrace a cooperative
and supportive approach to provide aid to those who need it. By
empowering nations through collaborative exchange, provision of
information, and resources support, the international community will
ensure that all nations are able to rise to the challenges already
manifesting through climatic variability and which are exacerbating
global, regional, and local water scarcity and stress.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether climate change has anthropogenic origins,
the human species will seek to acclimatize itself to its surroundings and,
generating and coordinating research efforts, and its ability to coordinate efforts within the UN
system. See id. (follow "About UN-Water" hyperlink).
210 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adaptation Fund, available at
http://unfccc.int/cooperation-and-support/financial-mechanism/adaptation-fund/items/3659.php
(last visited Dec. 7, 2009). The Adaptation Fund was created to provide funding for adaptation
projects and programmes in developing country that are especially vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change and that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Id. The Kyoto Protocol is a
protocol or supplemental agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. It was adopted on II December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. See
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 200.
211 The GEF is a global partnership that includes most of the world's nations, various international
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. Its mission is assist nations,
particularly those in the developing world, to address global and local environmental issues by
providing grants in six focal areas: biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land
degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants. See generally Global
Environmental Facility, http://www.gefweb.org/interior-right.aspx?id=50 (last visited Apr. 17,
2009).
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to the extent possible, its surroundings to people's needs and wants.
Human adaptation to climate change, in fact, is inevitable, but not
because of exuberant and idealistic longing to better the human
condition. Rather, it will emerge out of necessity, a response grounded
in humanity's survival mechanisms, as well as out of people's self-
interest and their desire to ensure and improve their lives and lifestyles.
The vital question that remains to be answered is: "How shoild
we proceed?" Although many of the effects of climate change described
in this article are likely unavoidable, how governments and human
society respond to those consequences is not inevitable. The path
chosen, though, could have grave and long-lasting implications for future
generations and for this planet. While some options are likely to enrich
peoples' lives and allow for a harmonious adaptation process, others
could produce disastrous results in terms of social and political discord,
human suffering, and a decayed environment. Accordingly, it is critical
that governments, international organizations, and civil society approach
the threat of climate change carefully, seriously, and collectively, but
also urgently. Moreover, the international community must accept the
reality that climate change is a global phenomenon that necessitates a
collective and coordinated response, and that principles of sovereignty
over territory and natural resources must yield to that reality.
The global community has been in a water crisis for many years.
Yet, the coming changes in climatic patterns, precipitation rates, and
rising temperatures present unprecedented challenges to people,
communities, nations, and the environment in ways that have never been
witnessed by humans on this planet. These changes will have a lasting
imprint on cultures, traditions, and lifestyles throughout the globe and
will challenge humanity's ability to adapt. Unless nations and peoples
can overcome sovereign differences and ideologies, unless we can
cooperate and coordinate our efforts in response to this global
phenomenon, we will condemn our children and our world to an arduous
and uncertain future.
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